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COMMENTS
MARYLAND'S FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN A
THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION: THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION
After the 1983 Court of Appeals of Maryland decision in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education there appeared little
hope for those who wished to reform disparities in public school
financing through the courts; With the recent publication of the
Maryland School Performance Program Reports, however, and enlightened decisions in other jurisdictions holding similar public school
financing schemes unconstitutional, evidence has emerged which is
capable of reviving a state constitutional challenge to Maryland's
existing public school financing scheme which is based upon local
wealth.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Education is vital to the exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution l and by article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 2 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
I. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Bill of Rights has been applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment on a selective basis. The concept
of due process, however, is not limited to the protection of the Bill of Rights.
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DaIl.) 386, 388 (1798) (fundamental rights cannot
be taken away by acts of state legislatures); see generally Ratner, A New Legal
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX.
L. REv. 777 (1985); see also, Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of
Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 1078 (1989), for an in-depth examination of educational opportunity
in the context of fundamental rights analysis.
2. Article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That no man
ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his "freehold, liberties or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived
of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the
Law of the land." Maryland courts have recognized that the concept of equal
protection is embodied in the due process requirement of article XXIV.
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"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. "3
In Plyler v. Doe, however, the Supreme Court held that, at least
for the purposes of the federal Constitution's equal protection clause,
education is not a fundamental right. 4 The Court added that, on the
other hand, "neither is [education] merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation."
, Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly recognized public education as a unifying social force and basic tool for shaping democratic
values. 6 An effective public school education in basic skills, available

Hornbeck v. Somerset Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 616 n.4, 458 A.2d 758,
768 n.4 (1983). The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
the concept of equal protection embodied· in article XXIV of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights are in pari materia and generally apply in a like manner.
[d. at 640, 458 A.2d at 781. However, the two provisions are independent of
each other so that a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.
[d.

.

3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Note that the words of
the Supreme Court in Brown retain their relevance today:
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to a democratic society. It is required in the performance
of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.
[d. at 493; see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
190 (Ky. 1989) (citing Brown in the context of finding Kentucky's public school
financing scheme unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban school districts).'
4. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
5. [d. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37
(1973) (Texas public school financing system using local property taxation as
a base is not violative of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal
protection when "no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation
in the political process. ").
6. See Abingdon School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) _(Brennan,
J. concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government. ");
Illinois ex rei. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (terming the public school as "the most powerful
agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people ...
at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
promoting our common destiny").
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on a nondiscriminatory basis to all Maryland school children, would
contribute immeasurably to the "social, economic, intellectual and
psychological well-being of the individual"7 and to the success of the
state as a whole. 8 When education is linked with the political process,
the Supreme Court and state courts of last resort have held that the
right to a certain minimum of education may command constitutional
protection. 9
7. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 231, 287 A.2d 187, 191 (1972) (citing
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 114-116 (S. Brown ed. 1941». See Plyler v. Doe, 457
V.S. 202, 222 (1982); see also Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 483
(D.D.C. 1967); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971) (Serrano I). In Serrano I, the court stated that:
[EJducation is unmatched in the extent to which it molds the personality of the youth of society. While police and fire protection, garbage
collection and street lights are essentially neutral in their effect on the
individual psyche, public education actively attempts to shape a child's
personal development in a manner chosen not by the child or his
parents but by the state.
Id. at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (citing Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 389); see also Biegel, supra note I, at 110613. In addition, there is an integral relationship between self-esteem and
academic achievement. See Mayer, The Self-Esteem Movement and the Right
to an Education Under California Constitutional Law, 5 V.C.L.A. J. Eouc.
123 (1991).
8. See generally Ratner, supra note I, at 781-85. Ratner identifies three fundamental functions of public school education which benefit society:
I) Political Function - Basic skills are necessary to protect free people from
tyranny. Citizens must be literate to intelligently exercise their basic civic duty
to vote, and to exercise their First Amendment rights in participation in our
democratic political process that depends on each individual's ability to protect
her own interests. Id. at 782-83;
2) Economic Function - In an industrialized and increasingly complex society,
basic skills are necessary to equip each child to compete in the labor market.
The failure to adequately educate students in basic skills is costly to society:
Functionally illiterate adults make up a disproportionately large
percentage of the unemployed, depriving the country of valuable
contributions to the gross national product and corresponding
tax revenue. Furthermore, functional illiterates who are employed
can be dangerous to themselves and to others, as well as expensive
to employers. Disproportionately high percentages of this group
commit crimes. Society not only suffers the, direct financial,
physical, and emotional losses caused by crime, but pays billions
of dollars per year to imprison the criminals. In addition, disproportionately high percentages of illiterate adults need welfare
and other forms of governmental assistance, for which society
pays billions of dollars per year.
Id. at 783-84.
3) National Defense Function - The level of skills needed for effective
military performance has increased because technology is more demanding. The
failure to sufficiently educate people seeking to enlist is one of the most serious
deficiencies in our national defense. Id. at 784-85.
9. The importance of public education to the political process has long been
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Section one of article VIII of the Maryland Constitution requires
that the General Assembly establish "a thorough and efficient"
recognized. In the words of Thomas Jefferson:
There is also an artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth
. . . . The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy ....
At the first session of our legislature [in Virginia) after the Declaration
of Independence, we passed ... laws, drawn by myself, [which] laid
the ax to the foot of pseudo-aristocracy. And had another which I
prepared been adopted by the legislature, our work would have been
complete. It was a bill for the more general diffusion of learning.
This proposed to divide every county into wards ... like your
townships; to establish in each ward a free school for reading, writing
and common arithmetic; to provide for the annual selection of the
best subjects from these schools, who might receive at the public
expense, a higher degree of education at a district school .... Worth
and genius would have thus been sought out from every condition of
life and completely prepared by education for defeating the competition of wealth and birth for public trusts.
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 231, 287 A.2d 187, 191 (1972) (citing
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 114-16 (S. Brown ed. 1941».
On the state level, a public school financing scheme which "condition[ed)
full entitlement to [education] on wealth" was held to violate equal protection
by the California Supreme Court in Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 48'7 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601. That court made a direct analogy between education and
voting, stating "both are crucial to participation in, and the functioning of, a
democracy .... At a minimum, education makes more meaningful the casting
of a ballot ... [and] is likely to provide the understanding of, and the interest
in, public issues which are to spur involvement in other civic and political
activities." Serrano I; 5 Cal. 3d at 608, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal Rptr. at
618. The Serrano I court also noted that the Supreme Court has recognized
the "sensitive interplay between education and the cherished First Amendment
right of free speech." Id. at 608 n.25, 487 P.2d at 1258 n.25, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 618 n.25 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."». See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly the 'market place of ideas.'
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
[a) robust exchange of ideas .. .").
The Serrano I court treated education as a "fundamental interest" due to
the "distinctive and priceless function of education in our society." Serrano
I, 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court
found support for this treatment in the stress placed upon the uniqueness of
education by the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
Id. at 609 n.26, 487 P.2d at 1258 n.26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.26. While
upholding a city's right to close municipal swimming pools rather than operate
them on an integrated basis, the Palmer Court distinguished its earlier refusal
in Brown v. Board oj Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1959) (Brown I), to allow the
closing of schools to avoid desegregation, stating that Brown 1 "did not involve
swimming pools but rather public schools, an enterprise we have described as
'perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. '" Id.
(quoting Palmer, 403 U.S. at 221 n.6). This distinction was also made by
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system of free public schools throughout the state and "provide by
taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance."l0 Maryland's public
elementary and secondary school system is administered by the State
Department of Education pursuant to the provisions of the Education
Article of the Maryland Code. 1I The General Assembly has charged
the State Board of Education, as head of the State Department of
Education, with the duty of determining the educational policies of
Justice Blackmun, who emphasized in his concurring opinion that "[t]he pools
are not part of the city's educational system. They are a general municipal
service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety." Id. (quoting Palmer, 403
U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring».
The Serrano I decision was subsequently reconsidered in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (Serrano II). The Serrano II court adhered to the
determinations of Serrano I based upon the California constitutional provision
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws, stating that the state equal protection
provisions, while "substantially the equivalent of" the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment, "are possessed of an independent vitality.... " Id.
at 764-65, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67. The Serrano II court
likewise reiterated its Serrano I holding that a public school financing scheme,
which, by drawing distinctions on the basis of district wealth, violated the
equal protection of students under state constitutional provisions. Id. at 766,
557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367. Just as the Supreme Court supported
its decision in Rodriguez partly on the basis that the issue of financing an
education raised serious considerations of federalism and deference to local
decisions, the Serrano II court found support for its conclusion in the language
of Rodriguez, noting that:
.
The high court, in passing on the validity of the Texas system under
the federal equal protection clause, repeatedly emphasized its lack of
"expertise" and familiarity with local problems of school financing
and educational policy, which lack of expertise "counsel[s] against
premature interference with informed judgments made at the state
and local levels."
Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42).
The Serrano court also examined the indispensable role played by education
in the modern industrial state:
This role, we believe, has two significant aspects: first, education is
a major determinant of an individUal's chances for economic and
social success in our competitive society; second, education is a unique
influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation
in political and community life. '[T]he pivotal position of education
to success in American society and its essential role in opening up to
the individual the central experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is undeniable.' Thus, education is the lifeline of both the
individual and society.
Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16 (1971)
(quoting Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065, 1129 (1969».
10. MD. CONST.art. VIII, § 1.
11. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. (1989 & Supp .. 1990).
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the State. 12 The State Board of Education is empowered to determine
and carry out policies, and to adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations
for the administration of the public school system. 13 The State
Superintendent of Schools is responsible for the administration of
the Department of Education. 14
Maryland's public school system consists of twenty-four school
districts, one for each county and Baltimore CityY Each school
district has its own school board, which, together with its local school
superintendent, controls the educational matters of its district. 16 Although local authorities determine the educational policy within their
district, the State Board of Education has the last word on any
matter concerning the policy and administration of public education. 17
Local school boards remain subject to the applicable bylaws, rules
and regulations of the State Board of Education, which have the
force of law when adopted and published. IS The Court of Appeals
of Maryland has expressly stated that the State Board of Education
plays a "paramount role in interpreting the [State's] education law."19
The State Board of Education has. published reports on the
performance of Maryland's public elementary and secondary schools
for the 1989-90, and 1990-91 school years. 20 These reports show gross
inequities among school districts in the quality of education available
to Maryland school children. 21 These inequities are indisputably linked
to the fact that financing for Maryland public schools is based on
local wealth. 22
The failure to provide an effective education in basic skills to a
large number of Maryland school children not only results in pro12. Clinton v. Board of Educ., 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989).
13. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(b) (1989).
14. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 603, 458 A.2d 758,
762 (1983).
15. Id.
16.Id.
17. Wilson v. Board of Educ., 234 Md. 561, 565, 200 A.2d 67, 69 (1964).
18. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 2-205(c)(2)-(c)(3) (1989).
19. Clinton .v. Board of Educ., 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989)
(citations omitted).
20. MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., MARYLAND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE PROGRAM
REpORT 1990, STATE & SCHOOL Sys. (1990) (Foreword by Joseph L. Shilling,
State Superintendent of Schools) [hereinafter 1990 MSPP REpORT]; MARYLAND
STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., MARYLAND SCHOOL· PERFORMANCE PROGRAM REPORT
1991, STATE & SCHOOL Sys. (1991) (Foreword by Nancy S. Grasmick, State
Superintendent of Schools) [hereinafter 1991 MSPP REPORT].
21. See 1990 & 1991 MSPP REpORTS, supra note 20; c/. Hornbeck v. Somerset
County Bd; of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 611-14, 458 A.2d 758, 766-67 (1983).
22. See Hornbeck at 611-16, 458 A.2d at 766-68; see also Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198-99 (Ky. 1989); Edgewood Indep.
School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989). See generally Briffault,
Our Localism, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21, 27 (1990).
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found injuries to these children, but produces severe political, economic, and social costs to the state. 23 Despite evidence of the
detrimental effects of Maryland's existing public school financing
scheme, the General Assembly has failed to correct these inadequacies. 24 Consequently, the courts must act in accordance with the

23. Cf. Ratner, supra note I, at 781-795; see also Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 1078, 1106-1116 (1989). The State of Maryland pays a
high price for its failure to provide an adequate education to a large segment
of its population, especially in the area of unemployment. In fiscal year 1991,
unemployment alone cost the State $409 million. Maryland Dep't. of Economic
& Employment, Office of Labor Market Analysis & Information, Unemployment Insurance Activity Report, Fiscal Year 1991 at 1 (1991); cf. Biegel, supra
note I, at 1113-14 (discussion of the views of educators, policymakers and
business on the cost of. denying adequate education). Xerox Corporation
Chairperson David T. Kerns has declared: "[I]f we do not restructure our
schools, this nation will be out of business by the year 2000." Biegel, supra
note I, at 1114.
24. There has been increasing statewide attention to the problems facing our public
school system. The Metropolitan Education Coalition (MEC) has been active
in attempting to improve the quality of education in the Baltimore area by
informing the public and legislators about education concerns, and specifically
by proposing a model funding formula which became a widely supported
Senate Bill. Metropolitan Education Coalition Newsletter, Spring 1991 [hereinafter Spring 1991 MEC Newsletter]; Metropolitan Education Coalition Newsletter, Special Edition, Fall 1990 [hereinafter Fall 1990 MEC Newsletter] (both
on file with the University of Baltimore Law Review). The MEC platform
includes, inter alia, the following principles:
SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY - Principles:
Efforts to demonstrate effectiveness and accountability in the spending
of funds, through school performance programs of assessment and
accountability for outcomes, are essential to building public confidence
in public school systems. Such programs should measure school and
school system progress compared to their baseline data so that those
systems working against greater odds are not penalized. Support and
incentives toward reaching standards should be emphasized to ensure
success for all students regardless of background or place of residence:
FUNDING EQUALIZATION - Principles: The primary responsibility
for furiding public education lies with the state. Therefore, state
funding must be improved and distributed so as to promote equity.
The local and federal governments also share responsibility for meeting
fundamental education requirements. These responsibilities must be
carried out in a flexible and fair manner in order to meet the differing
needs of students around the state.
Fall 1990 MEC Newsletter, at 3.
Other education promoters echo the MEC's position that none of their
specific concerns can be addressed until public school financing is made more
equitable. Miller, Funding Reform Top Priority of Metro Education Coalition,
Fall 1990 MEC Newsletter at 2-3. In July 1990, at State Board of Education
hearings held to consider opinions on proposals for reform submitted by
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Maryland Constitution to ensure that public school financing is

Superintendent of Schools, Joseph Schilling, MEC's testimony on equitable
financing drew support from "average" districts, such as Dorchester County,
and from the highest spending district, Montgomery County, in addition to
the poorer counties. [d. Dr. Robert C. Dubel, then Superintendent of Baltimore
County schools was "fully supportive" of [MEC) , stating, "I'm not saying
the county doesn't have funding needs too, but I certainly think it is good
and proper for Baltimore City to get a bigger share of the pie." [d.
Lawmakers also recognize that Maryland public schools are failing under
the existing financing scheme. In 1991, for example, Senators Young, Piccinini,
Miedusiewski, Lawlah, Hughes, Pica and Blount introduced Senate Bill No.
494, for the purpose of creating an Aid for Needy Schools fund. The bill's
preamble explains the premises upon which the proposal was based:
WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General Assembly to provide
the best educational opportunities for all elementary and secondary
school age children in the State through a general system of free
public schools; and .
WHEREAS, The majority of the funding for the public school
system comes from the taxing of assessable real property by each of
the subdivisions of the State; and
WHEREAS, It is becoming increasingly apparent that this funding
scheme is falling short of providing adequate and consistent amounts
of revenue throughout the State; and
WHEREAS, The inequities in the funding levels are so significant
as to preclude the delivery of quality educational opportunities to all
elementary and secondary public schools in the State; and
WHEREAS, The federal, State, and local governments are severely
limited in improving this deficit due to ever-growing and competing
priorities; and
WHEREAS, The people of the State, who each stand to benefit
from a public school system that provides quality education to all
students, should be given the opportunity to volunteer to assist directly
in alleviating the funding gaps in the public school system; and
WHEREAS, The financial institutions where the people of the State
conduct their financial transactions are best equipped to facilitate the
voluntary donations that citizens may want to make in order to help
the schools that are in need of additional funding ....
The Aid for Needy Schools fund seemed to be intended to facilitate the
opportunity to make "charitable" donations to needy public schools by establishing check book contribution plans with local banks to be administered by
the State Board of Education. S.B. 494 (introduced Feb. 1, 1991).
However, the 1991 legislative session ended with no action taken by the
General Assembly to improve public school financing, though· several other
bills which addressed the public school financing problem were introduced.
Each of these bills either did not make it out of the committee to which they
were assigned, or were assigned to interim study. See S.B. 839 (introduced
March 4, 1991) (repealing Maryland's existing public school financing scheme);
S.B. 764 (introduced Feb. II, 1991) (the Tax Fairness Act of 1991) (implementing the recommendation of the Governor's Commission on State Taxes
and Tax Structure (Linowes»; S.B. 550 (introduced Feb. I, 1991) (the Governor's New Action Plan for Educational Excellence (APEX»; S.B. 494 (introduced Feb. I, 1991) (Education-Aid for Needy School Funds); S.B. 321
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sufficient to provide the means for an adequate education to all
school children throughout the state. 2'
(introduced Jan. 30, 1991) (Public Education - Cost of Education Index, adding
to Section 5-202(g) of the Maryland Education Code); H.B. 203 (introduced
Jan. 24, 1991) (State Aid for Public Education - Schools for Success); H.B.
677 (introduced Feb. I, 1991) (allowing income tax deductions for contributions
to local districts); S.B. 757 (introduced Feb. 11, 1991) (requiring local districts
to pay for social security and retirement increases beyond fiscal year 1991
level). In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee issued an unfavorable report on H.B. 886, (Maryland School Performance Accountability Reports), which would enact the Maryland School Performance system as
accountability reporting requirements.
Past efforts of the General Assembly have not achieved the constitutionallymandated level of education under a public school financing scheme based
upon local wealth. In 1979, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 243, which
increased the foundation amount from $624 to $784, and required State and
local governments to share the new money on a 50/50 basis and continue to
share the old money ($624) on a 55/45 basis; That same year, the Task Force
to Study State-Local Fiscal Relationships (Scanlan Task Force), a commission
appointed in 1979, first looked at the concept of relating state aid for current
expenses to actual education expenditures. The Scanlan Task Force recommended improvements to the financing formula, such as a substantial increase
in the minimum amount that a district may spend on current basic expenses
per pupil. In response, the 1980 General Assembly passed legislation which, in
theory, tied the per pupil foundation amount to actual per student spending.
See 1980 Md. Laws, ch. 531. Chapter 531 increased the foundation amount to
$924. The foundation amount was to equal 7511/0 of the statewide three year
average of per pupil expenditures for basic current expenses. However, the
overall financing level was never based on actual spending because yearly
increases in the foundation amount were capped at the lesser of eight percent
or the annual increase in the consumer price index. This cap never permitted
aid levels to be on par with spending levels. See DEPARTMENT OF FISCAL SERVS.,
VOL. VII LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK SERIES, MARYLAND LOCAL GOVERNMENTREVENUES AND TAXES 98 (1990) [hereinafter MLGRT).
In 1983, the Task Force to Study the Funding of Public Education (Civiletti
Task Force) reaffirmed the concept of using a 7511/0 expenditure target to
determine the per pupil foundation amount. Although the Civiletti Task Force
wanted to reach 7511/0 of a two-year average of per pupil expenditures for basic
current expenses by fiscal year 1989, the General Assembly enacted a less costly
recommendation. See 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 85. The General Assembly set flat
dollar amounts for the foundation amount through fiscal year 1989, and
thereafter the three year average spending level was to be used with the eight
percent cap remaining. The Civiletti legislation also established an Accountability Task force to ensure that new monies were used for instruction and for
teacher's salaries. In 1988, the Accountability Task Force was terminated and
responsibility for review of accountability reports was transferred to the State
Department of Education. See MLGRT, supra, at 101.
In 1987, The Action Plan for Educational Excellence (APEX Plan) was
enacted. See 1987 Md. Laws, ch. 277. The APEX Plan modified the basic'
current expense formula, basing the per pupil financing levels after fiscal year
1992 on two-year average expenditure figures. The flat dollar rate remains in
effect through fiscal year 1992. In fiscal year 1993, the two-year average
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In advocating judicial intervention in the area of public school
financing based on local wealth, this Comment first explains the
General Assembly's affirmative obligation under article VIII of the
Maryland Constitution to provide an adequate public education to
all Maryland school children. The Comment then examines the
evidence necessary to raise a constitutional challenge to Maryland's
existing public school financing scheme, on the ground that it violates
article VIII. In support of the soundness of judicial intervention into
the area of public school financing based on local wealth, the
experience of jurisdictions with similar constitutional requirements
and public school financing schemes, in particular New Jersey, is
examined. The experience of these jurisdictions reveals that deference
to the legislature in the area of public school financing based on
local wealth results in protracted legal battles which prolong the
injuries to affected school children. Ultimately, judicial intervention
is required to' uphold constitutional mandates to provide adequate
education.
The State of Maryland is constitutionally mandated to spend its
money to provide an adequate public school education. Thus far,
however, the General Assembly's efforts to provide such an education
have failed under the existing public school financing scheme. For
this reason, this Comment concludes that immediate judicial intervention is warranted. The General Assembly should be ordered to
fulfill its affirmative obligation to provide school children with an
education constitutionally mandated to be "thorough and efficient."
II. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S AFFIRMATIVE
OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE EDUCATION

A. The State Constitution Mandates that the General Assembly
Establish a System oj Free Public Schools
Under the Maryland Constitution, the General Assembly has an
affirmative obligation to provide a "thorough and efficient" system
spending level will determine the foundation amount. The distinction between
this plan and previous enactments is that annual increases are not automatically
capped. See MLGRT, supra, at 99. Total state aid for education, however,
has never exceeded 30 percent of general fund revenues. If state aid for
education in anyone year exceeds 31.5 percent of total general fund revenues,
the foundation amount for that year may not be implemented unless the
General Assembly affirms by joint resolution that the state has the fiscal
resources for the aid required. [d. at 101. If a joint resolution is not enacted,
basic current expense is capped at eight percent over the prior year's amount.
[d.

25. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 632, 639, 458 A.2d at 776-77, 780.

1991)

Judicial Intervention in Public Education

439

of public school education. 26 In 1983, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education,27
recognized the General Assembly's duty to establish a statewide public
school system which "provide[s] the State's youth with a basic public
school education" that is "effective in all· districts. "28 The court
stated that compliance with this duty would result in compliance with
article VIII of the Maryland Constitution which provides:
The General Assembly . . . shall by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public
Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for
their maintenance. 29
The Hornbeck court recognized that under article VIII, the public
school financing fund "shall be kept inviolate, and appropriated only
to the purposes of Education. "30 The court also noted three important
aspects of article III of the Maryland Constitution: one, that the
State budget shall "include an· 'estimate of all appropriations ... in
conformity with Art. VIII;"'31 two, that the General Assembly is
prohibited from amending the Budget Bill so as to affect the provisions made by the laws of the State for the establishment and
maintenance of a system of public schools;32 and three, that the
Governor shall include the estimates for financing public schools in
the budget "without revision.' '33
These constitutional provisions evince the fundamental principle
that State responsibility for the effectiveness of public education34 is
"vital to the history and traditions of the people of this State. "35
The Hornbeck court acknowledged that education plays a central
role in one's chances for economic and social success, and influences
one's development as a good citizen and participant in political and
community life. 36 Although the right to education is explicit in the
Maryland Constitution, the Hornbeck court agreed with the Supreme
Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).
[d. at 632, 458 A.2d at 776.
MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 608 n.3, 458 A.2d at 764 n.3.
[d. at 646, 458 A.2d at 784 (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(4».
[d. (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(6».
[d. (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(11».
[d. at 668, 458 A.2d at 795. (Cole, J., dissenting) ("it is the State's responsibility
to provide for the maintenance of the school system") (emphasis in original).
35. Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 715, 426 A.2d 929, 947 (1981).
36. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 649-50, 458 A.2d at 786.
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Rodriguez,3? and held that, under both the Maryland Constitution38
and the United States Constitution, education is not a fundamental
right. 39 Consequently, the Hornbeck court explained that the public
school financing scheme chosen by the General Assembly is subject
to careful examination by the courts only if a significant deprivation
of the right to adequate education occurs.40
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The Maryland Public School Financing Scheme

The financing scheme chosen by the Maryland legislature places
responsibility for public school financing largely on the individual
counties. Because the Maryland Constitution obligates the State not the counties - to provide financing for public education, the
State has abdicated its constitutional responsibility.
Maryland's public school financing scheme, codified in section
5-202(b) of the Education Article of the Maryland Code, is patently
dependent upon local wealth. 41 Called the "Lee~Maurer formula,"42
the financing scheme pays for "basic current expenses"43 with both
state and county revenues. 44 The State, however, pays for only a
percentage of the minimum amount that must be spent on each
child, with local revenues paying for the rest. 4S Those districts with
less wealth have less to contribute to their local education.
The financing scheme works as follows. The General Assembly
first establishes a "foundation" amount, which is the minimum
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

45.

411 U.S. I (1973).
Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782.
Id. at 650, 458 A.2d at 786; see supra note I and accompanying text.
Id. at 652, 458 A.2d at 787.
See id. at 605, 458 A.2d at 762; MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(b) (1989 &
Supp. 1991).
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(b) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
"Basic current expenses" are the expenditures made by a county from State
and county revenue for public elementary and secondary schools (with the
exception of payment for debt service, capital outlay, transportation, and state
aid for handicapped children, driver education and food services). MD. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 5-202(a)(3) (1989); see also Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 604, 458 A.2d
at 762.
See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 604-05, 458 A.2d at 762-63. Federal aid is minimal,
accounting for approximately eight percent of total aid. See id. n.l; see also
Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 331, 575 A.2d 359, 381 (1990). For the 198687 fiscal year, federal revenues provided 6.4 percent of the average state public
school financing budget. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T. OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUC. STATISTICS 1989, at 149. In any event,
federal aid should not be a factor in determining the state's obligation. The
Abbott court found that even the mere consideration of federal aid in determining the need for or amount of state aid would violate federal law. Abbott,
119 N.J. at 331, 575 A.2d at 381.
See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 605, 458 A.2d at 762-63.
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amount each district must spend annually on basic current expenses
for each child enrolled. 46 The State then contributes financial assistance only as a percentage of this predetermined foundation amount
set by the General Assembly. 47 The rest of the foundation amount

46.Id.
47. Id. The Hornbeck court observed that the General Assembly intended this
scheme to equalize for differences in local wealth by providing a larger
contribution of state aid to the school districts with lesser wealth per student,
in order for each district to meet its foundation amount. See id. Under § 5202(a), a district's wealth is determined by the sum of the assessed valuation
of real property, public utility operating property, and net taxable income.
MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(a)(8) (1989). Section 5-202(b)(3) provides that,
to be eligible to receive the state's share of basic current expenses, the district's
governing body "shall levy an annual tax sufficient to provide an amount of
revenue for elementary and secondary public education purposes equal to the
product of the wealth of the county and a local contribution rate determined
for each fiscal year."
Wealth per pupil in dollars by district for the 1989-90 school year was:
1. Allegany
$ 104,895
2. Anne Arundel
164,782
3. Baltimore City
101,246
4. Baltimore County
219,877
5. Calvert
183,315
6. Caroline
89,048
7. Carroll
125,797
8. Cecil
102,234
9. Charles
124,109
10. Dorchester
115,981
11. Frederick
126,188
12. Garrett
97,297
13. Harford
120,988
14. Howard
195,827
15. Kent
167,188
16. Montgomery
283,757
17. Prince George's
149,818
18. Queen Anne's
159,842
19. St. Mary's
114,069
20. Somerset
87,347
21. Talbot
277,195
22. Washington
121,375
23. Wicomico
117,568
358,708
24. Worcester
1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20.
Section 5-202(b)(2) specifies that the shared basic current expense amount is to
be calculated based upon a statewide aggregate of expenditures for basic current
expenses during the third and fourth preceding fiscal years, divided by full-time
students. To determine the counties' share of this amount, . section 5-202(b)(4)
provides that the sum of the basic current expenses to be shared by all the counties
shall be multiplied by 0.45 for the first $624. The amount exceeding $624 is then
multiplied by 0.50, and the two products are added. Id. The resulting sum is divided
by the sum of wealth of all the counties. Id. The resulting quotient, rounded to
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is paid for by local school districts as a group.4a The actual percentage
that each district must contribute each year toward its share of the
foundation amount varies based upon the district's taxable wealth. 49
The greater a district's taxable wealth, the greater its required contribution to the foundation amount. 50
Although the foundation amount is the only contribution to
public school financing mandated by the General Assembly,SI it
represents only a small fraction of the actual cost needed to educate
an individual child. Because the State contributes only a percentage
of the foundation amount, 52 the State, in essence, is contributing
very little towards the overall amount needed to educate each child.
Every district has found it necessary to spend considerably more per
student each year than the foundation amount,S3 and it must do so
at its own expense. For example, in 1989-90, the General Assembly
set the foundation amount at $1999 per pupil. s4 The minimum amount
actually spent that year by a district was $4,049 per student; the
highest amount spent per student was $6,629. 55 Thus, under Maryland's existing public school financing scheme, a district's public
school financing is largely dependent upon its ability to raise local
taxes. 56 State aid contributes very little. The dependence of public

seven decimal places, and expressed as a percentage with five decimal places, is the
local contribution rate. [d. The state's share of basic current expenses for each
county is the difference between the county share as calculated above and the total
basic current expenses.
48. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 605, 458 A.2d at 762-63.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 606, 458 A.2d at 763.
52. See id. at 604, 458 A.2d at 762-63.
53. See id. at 606-07, 458 A.2d 763-64. The Hornbeck court observed that:
[T]he State share of basic current expenses in fiscal year 1980 amounted
to $331,880,120, or 54 percent of the total; the local school districts
appropriated $283,281,866, or 46 percent of the total basic current
expenses ....
In addition to these educational expenditures, each local subdivision
spends substantial sums of money for the support of its local schools.
Because of differences in assessed property valuations among the
subdivisions, the amounts raised through local taxation and spent per
pupil vary from district to district, depending upon the district's tax
wealth and/or inclination to spend money to enhance the educational
resources and opportunities available to its students. These discretionary local expenditures result in substantial spending imbalances between the districts - imbalances which are only partially offset by
the State's equalization and other aid.
[d.

54. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 5-202(b)(2)3(ii) (1989).
55. See 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20.
56. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 606-07, 458 A.2d at 763-64.
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school financing on local wealth results in disparities in the amount
school districts can spend per student. For example, in 1987-88,
$2,350 per student separated the lowest and highest spending districts,
which equates to a difference of over $70,000 per classroom of
thirty.s7 By 1990-91, this gap increased to $2,599 per student, or
$77,970 per classroom of thirty.s8
Under Maryland's existing public school financing scheme, this
disparity between wealthy and poor school districts is growing. From
the 1988-89 school year t6 the 1989-90 school year, the average of
the bottom five counties fell $106 per pupil below the average of the
top five counties. s9 In 1979-80, the poorest school district was able
to spend only 61.3 percent as much as the wealthiest;60 in 1991, this
figure dropped to only 59.4 percent. 61
It is clear that poorer school districts suffer under a public
school financing scheme dependent upon local wealth62 because they
have a limited tax base from which to raise revenues for education. 63
Additionally, many urban districts are affected by "municipal overburden," a condition in which the cost of local government, such as
fire fighters, police officers, garbage collection and road maintenance,
is so high that the district is either unwilling or unable to raise taxes
further to support education. 64 In general, poorer urban districts not
only have greater school tax rates than wealthier districts, but total
property tax rates usually exceed those in wealthier districts. 6S

57. Miller, Funding Re/orm Top Priority 0/ Metro Education Coalition, Fall 1990
MEC Newsletter, supra note 24, at 1.
58. Report Card Gives Schools Credit For Trying Harder, The Baltimore Sun,
Nov. 3, 1991 at AI, col.2 (reporting on the 1991 Maryland School Performance
Program Report) (Baltimore City spends $4,614 per student, while Montgomery
County spends $7,213).
59. Spring 1991 MEC Newsletter, supra note 24, at 12.
6O.Id.
61. Id.
62. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 608-14, 458
A.2d 758, 764-67 (1983); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 324-34, 575 A.2d
359, 378-82 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989). See generally Ratner, supra note 1.
63. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 611-12, 458 A.2d at 766; Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d
at 393; see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 20-21.
64. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 355-57, 575 A.2d at 393-94; see also Hornbeck, 295
Md. at 609, 458 A.2d at 765; Briffault, supra note 22, at 20-21.
65. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 613-14, 458 A.2d at 767. At trial in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, Judge Ross stated that Baltimore City has less local
revenue available for school financing because it must devote a greater share
of its tax base and locally raised revenues to non school services. Although
Judge Ross recognized the problem of municipal overburden, because he found
the entire financing scheme unconstitutional, he did not address this issue. Id.
See generally Briffault, supra note 22, at 19-20.
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This condition is exemplified by Baltimore City. The total property tax rate in Baltimore City is more than double that of any other
county in the state. 66 Although Baltimore City levies at a rate higher
than any other district, it provides below average financing to its
public schools. 67 Thus the system of local financing is disproportionately burdensome for the Baltimore City School District.
Article VIII of the Maryland Constitution obligates the State,
not the counties or B?.ltimore City, to provide financing for thorough
and efficient schools. 68 Because section 5-202(b) provides state financial assistance for only a portion of the legislatively required foundation amount, and each district annually spends at least twice the
foundation amount per pUpil,69 the General Assembly has, in effect,
abdicated its constitutional obligation to provide by taxation or
otherwise for the maintenance of a thorough and efficient system of
public schools.70
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board oj Education was the first
challenge to the constitutionality of section 5-202(b). In Hornbeck,
the boards of education of Somerset, Caroline, and St. Mary's
counties, and the school commissioners of Baltimore City, together
with taxpayers, students, parents, public officials, and school superintendents, claimed that Maryland's public school financing scheme
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the equal protection guarantee of article XXIV of the Maryland

66. MARYLAND ASS'N OF COUNTIES, PROPERTY TAX RATES ·IN MARYLAND'S SUBDIVISIONS, 1987-1991 (1991).
67. [d.; see Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 610, 458 A.2d at 765. From fiscal year 198687 to fiscal year 1990-91, Baltimore City increased its general fund contribution
to schools by 47.8 percent, far more than the 23.3 percent increase in the city's
total budget. Spring 1991 MEC Newsletter, supra note 24, at 12. In contrast
during the same four year period, the state increased its aid to schools by only
30.7 percent, while it increased the state's total general fund budget by 38.8
percent. [d.
68. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 631 nn. 11 & 12, 458 A.2d at 776 nn. 11 & 12; see
also BriffauJt, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that where local government is
accountable to the state, the state is more vulnerable to legal attack).
69. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 606-07, 609, 458 A.2d at 763-65; 1990 & 1991
MSPP REPORTS, supra note 20.
70. In practical terms, the state contribution to basic current educational expenses
accounts for less than half the amount spent per student. See Hornbeck, 295
Md. at 606, 458 A.2d at 763. Maryland, "the eighth richest state in the
nation," is "42nd in its monetary contribution to public education." Miller,
Funding Rejorm Top Priority oj Metro Education Coalition, Fall 1990 MEC
Newsletter, supra note 24, at 1. The average state public school financing
scheme relied on state revenues to provide 49.8 percent of its budget for the
1986-87 fiscal year. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1989, at 149.
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Declaration of Rights, and section one of article VIII of the Maryland
Constitution. 71
The plaintiffs alleged that Maryland's public school financing
scheme resulted in discriminatory, unequal and inadequate financing
that left the plaintiff school boards unable to meet the constitutionally
mandated level of adequate education. 72 As evidence that Maryland's
public school financing scheme was unconstitutional as applied to
students in poorer districts, to poor students throughout the State,
and in particular to students in Baltimore City, the plaintiffs pointed
to wide disparities in the taxable wealth among the various school
districts, and the effect of those differences upon the ability of the
poorer school districts to provide their stud~nts with educational
offerings and resources comparable to those of the wealthier school
districts. 73
At trial in the Circuit Court of Baltimore .City, 74 the Honorable
David Ross found from the evidence that:
[T]he present financing scheme significantly underfunds the
plaintiffs' schools whose requirements are at least as great
as any in the State, while it permits virtually unlimited
spending in other subdivisions. As a result the quality of
the schools in plaintiffs' subdivisions is inferior to those in
the wealthier subdivisions with respect to the buildings,
equipment, materials and staff. 75
Judge Ross found that the General Assembly had failed to set
qualitative standards for public school education, and held that article
V~II required the public school system to be "full, complete and
effective by contemporary standards throughout the State. "76 Because
Judge Ross found that section 5-202(b) did not provide the means
to achieve the constitutionally mandated standard of education, he
held that Maryland's public school financing scheme did not comply
with the thorough and efficient clause of article VIII of the Maryland
Constitution. 77
Judge Ross further held that, under article XXIV of the Maryland Constitution, mathematical equality among pupils with respect
to public school financing was required. 78 Because he found that
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 607, 458 A.2d at 764.
Id. at 608, 458 A.2d at 764.
Id. at 603, 458 A.2d at 761-62.
See id. at 611-19, 458 A.2d at 766-70.
Id. at 616, 458 A.2d at 768.
Id. Judge Ross found the words "thorough and efficient" unambiguous, and
stated that the standard must be established and maintained in every district.
Id. at 615, 458 A.2d at 768.
77. Id. at 616, 458 A.2d at 768.
78. Id. at 618-19, 458 A.2d at 769-70.
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section 5-202(b) did not provide adequate and equal financing for
each pupil in the state,79 Judge Ross held that the entire public school
financing scheme violated the equal protection guarantee of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. sO
Responding to the State's 'petition for certiorari,S) the Court of
Appeals of Maryland recognized that Maryland's public school financing scheme is dependent on local revenues and spending choices, which
results in undeniable demographic and environmental disadvantages to
children who reside in poorer school districts. s2 The court held, however,
that inequities in Maryland's public school financing scheme did not
violate the equal protection guarantees of dther the fourteenth
amendmentS3 or article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 84
The court determined that, in the absence of a suspect classificationsS
79.Id.
80.Id.
81. The court of appeals granted certiorari prior to a decision in the case by the
court of special appeals. Id. at 601, 458 A.2d at 758.
82. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
83. Id. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782.
84. Id.at 650, 458 A.2d at 786.
85. Id. at 652, 458 A.2d at 787 (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to hold
that financial status alone creates a suspect class).
In Serrano v. Priest, 5. Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971), the Supreme Court of California recognized that no direct authority
existed for the proposition that education is a fundamental interest which may
not be conditioned on wealth. Id. at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
615. The court noted that wealth classifications have been invalidated only in
conjunction with the rights of criminal defendants and voting rights. Id. The
Serrano court did, however find persuasive the Supreme Court's decision in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 395 U.S. 618 (1969). Id. at 604 n.22, 487 P.2d at 1255
n.22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.22. The Serrano court indicated in dictum that
certain wealth discrimination in the area of education would be unconstitutional:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal
integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its
expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any
other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by
invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. It could not, for
example, reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from school.
Id. (quoting Shapiro at 633). Although the Shapiro decision referred to actual
exclusion from school, the Serrano court found the same constitutional principle
applies to discrimination in expenditures for education. Id. In support of this
conclusion, the Serrano court pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964), in which the Court asserted
that the right to. vote is impaired not only when the qualified individual is
barred from voting, but also when the impact of his ballot is diminished by
unequal electoral apportionment. Id. at 607 n.24, 487 P.2d 1257 n.24, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 617 n.24. Furthermore, the Serrano court noted that in Hargrove v.
Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (1970) (on remand from the Fifth Circuit), a three
judge panel held a Florida statute, which limited the local property tax rate
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or impingement upon a fundamental right,86 the constitutionality of
Maryland's public school financing scheme was presumed. 87 Finding
that the financing scheme neither impinged upon a fundamental right
nor utilized a suspect classification, the court applied the rational basis
test, which invalidates a statutory classification only if the statute uses
a classification which is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a
legitimate state purpose. 88 The Hornbeck court found that Maryland's
public school financing scheme, though patently dependent upon local
wealth, reasonably furthered the legitimate state purpose of effectuating
the tradition of local control over the operation of schools. 89

86.
87.

88.
89.

which a county could levy in raising school revenue, unconstitutional under
traditional equal protection analysis because there was no rational basis for its
discriminatory effect on poor counties. The Hargrove court therefore declined
to determine whether education was a fundamental interest. On appeal, the
Supreme Court vacated the opinion on other grounds but indicated that on
remand the court should fully explore the equal protection issue. Serrano at
604 n.22, 487 P.2d at 1255 n.22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615 n.22. Recognizing that
these cases had precedential value only in the context of racial segregation or
total exclusion from school, the Serrano court nonetheless found them relevant
in considering the importance of education. Id. at 605 n.23, 487 P.2d at 1256
n.23, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617 n.23.
Furthermore, the Serrano court found a comparison of the importance of
the right to education with the rights of defendants in criminal cases helpful
in reaching its constitutional conclusion. Id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1257-58, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. The court recognized that:
[E]ducation may have a far greater social significance than a free
transcript or a court appointed lawyer. •[E]ducation not only affects
directly a vastly greater number of persons than the criminal law, but
it affects them in ways which - to the state - have an enormous and
much more varied significance. Aside from reducing the crime rate
(the inverse relation is strong), education also supports each and every
other value of democratic society-participation, communication, and
social mobility, to name but a few.'
Id. (quoting Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 36263 (1969».
In reaching the conclusion that education must be treated as a fundamental
interest, the Serrano court also recognized the pervasive impact of education.
The court noted that, unlike other government services, every person benefits
from education, and few other services involve such sustained contact with the
recipient. Id. at 609, 487 P .2d 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 619. Indeed, "a child of
the poor assigned willy-nilly to an inferior state school takes on the complexion
of a prisoner, complete with a minimum sentence of 12. years." Id. at 610,
487 P.2d 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. 619 (quoting Coon et aI., supra, at 388).
Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 645, 458 A.2d at 783; c/. supra note l.
Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 642, 458 A.2d at 782.
Id.
Id. at 654, 458 A.2d at 788. But c/. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989). The Edgewood court stated:
Some have argued that reform in school finance will eliminate local
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The court of appeals also flatly rejected the proposition that article
VIII mandates exact equality of per pupil financing as the required
means of establishing a thorough and efficient statewide system of
public schools. 90 The issue in Hornbeck, as framed by the court of
appeals, was not "whether there are great disparities in educational
opportunities among the State's school districts," but rather, whether
the same mathematically precise amount of money was required to be
spent on each child's education, or whether any county was prohibited
from spending more. 9J The court of appeals found that no such
requirement existed under either the federal or state constitution, and
thus held that no constitutional violation had occurred.92 The court
stated that, in light of historical evidence, the words "thorough and
efficient" found in article VIII are not the equivalent of "uniform."93
The court concluded that any equality component of the "thorough
and efficient" language of article VIII is limited to requiring the General
Assembly to provide a basic or adequate education to the State's
children. 94
In addition to recognizing the General Assembly's affirmative
obligation under article VIII to provide a basic or adequate public
education, the court further explained that it was the responsibility of
the General Assembly, not the courts, to determine the quantity and
quality of educational opportunities available to Maryland school children.9s The court found that the General Assembly had established
such statewide qualitative standards pursuant to the Education Article
of the Maryland Code and the state regulatory scheme. 96 The Hornbeck
court noted that the General Assembly was making continuous efforts

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.

control, but this argument has no merit. An efficient system does not
preclude the ability of communities to exercise local control over the
education of their children. It requires only that the funds available
for education be distributed equitably and evenly. An efficient system
will actually allow for more local control, not less. It will provide
property-poor districts with economic alternatives that are not now
available to them. Only if alternatives are indeed availlible can a
community exercise the control of making choices.
[d. The Hornbeck court recognized this argument but found it unpersuasive
under the rational basis test. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 656, 485 A.2d 78990. At least one commentator argues that local autonomy is actually central
to preventing greater equality. See Briffault, supra note 22, at 5, 23-39
(discussing the history of public school financing cases. and the interest of local
autonomy).
Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
[d. at 658, 458 A.2d at 790.
[d. at 640-57, 458 A.2d at 780-90.
[d. at 631, 458 A.2d at 776.
[d. at 631-32, 458 A.2d at 776-77.
[d. at 658-59, 458 A.2d at 790.
[d. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780 (citing the Education Article of the Maryland
Code and COMAR Title 13A).
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to provide school children with a thorough and efficient education,97
and made clear that it would not interfere with the General Assembly's
methods of solving educational problems so long as constitutional
mandates were met. 98
The Hornbeck court found that the plaintiffs had failed even to
allege that statewide qualitative standards of education were not being
met. 99 Thus, while there was abundant evidence to support the proposition that Maryland's public school financing scheme fostered unequal
educational opportunities among children throughout the state,IOO the
court found that, under the facts presented, no child in the state was
significantly deprived of the right to an adequate education as prescribed
by article VIII of the Maryland Constitution. 101 Under this rationale,
when there is no demonstration that the General Assembly has failed
to fulfill its obligation under article VIII to provide for an adequate
education, a constitutional challenge to Maryland's public school financing scheme cannot be maintained simply by showing that the
educational resources available. in poorer school districts are inferior to
those in the wealthier districts. 102
The Hornbeck court established that, in order to sustain an article
VIII constitutional challenge to the State's public school financing
scheme, the very least that is required is an evidentiary showing that
schools in any district fail to provide an adequate education, as
measured by contemporary educational standards. 103 The court further
indicated that, should the qualitative educational standards established
by the General Assemblyl()4 not be met, or should the State's public
school financing scheme fail to provide each school district with the
means essential to provide the basic education contemplated by the
thorough and efficient clause of article VIII of the Maryland Constitution, the possibility exists that Maryland's existing public school
financing scheme could be found unconstitutional. lOS
III. NEW EVIDENCE OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION
SERVES TO REVIVE A STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE TO MARYLAND'S PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCING SCHEME BASED ON LOCAL WEALTH
In the nine years since Hornbeck, it has become increasingly
apparent that public school financing schemes that are dependent
97. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
98. Id. at 658-59, 458 A.2d at 790.
99. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
100. Id. at 611-16, 458 A.2d at 766-68.

101. Id. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
102. Id. But ct. Biegel, supra note 1 (discussing heightened review of equal education
opportunity).
103. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
104. Id. See generally 1990 & 1991 MSPP REPORTS, supra note 20.
105. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780.
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upon local wealth do not provide poorer school districts with the
means to provide adequate education. I06 The discriminatory effect of
public school financing schemes based on local wealth has been well
documented. I07 Moreover, disparity in educational opportunity has
been recognized in several jurisdictions as evidence that public school
financing schemes dependent upon local wealth fail to provide students in poorer school districts with a thorough and efficient public
education, that is, an effective education in the basic skills necessary
to compete in the job market and participate responsibly in the
democratic process .108
In 1989, primarily due to concern on the part of Maryland
Governor William Donald Schaefer that the structure and procedures
106. See supra note 21. For examples of successful court challenges prior to
Hornbeck, see Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) and
Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en
banc). Both courts defined the constitutional duty in terms of results, i.e., the
, school must provide education which enables students to adequately participate
in the democratic, and economic system.
107. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 196-99 (Ky. 1989);
Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990); Robinson v.
Cahill, 1I8 N.J. Super. 223, 236-256, 287 A.2d 187, 194-204, afl'd on rehearing,
119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d
273 (Robinson l), afl'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson Il),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 19-21.
Studies also show that public schools with predominantly minority students
particularly suffer from lower quality education, due to the relative indifference,
of school boards to these schools. See Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell, III S. Ct. 630, 643 n.5 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice
Marshall points out in the context of desegregation, the poor quality of a
school system may be so severe that substantial reform is required. Id. (citing
Jenkins'v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1301-1307 (8th Cir. 1988), afl'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 495 U.S. 33 (1990».
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), held that higher per
pupil expenditures in schools predominantly serving white students than in
schools with black students deprived the District of Columbia's black and poor
public school children of their right to equal educational opportunity with the
district's more affluent white children. The court stated:
If the situation were one involving racial imbalance but in some
facility other than public schools, or unequal educational opportunity
but without [racial] or poverty aspects (e.g. unequal schools all within
an economically homogeneous white suburb), it might be pardonable
to uphold the practice on a minimal showing of rational basis. But
the fusion of these two elements in de facto segregation in public
schools irresistibly calls for additional justification. What supports
this case is ... the degree to which the poor and [minorities] must
rely on the public schools in rescuing themselves from their depressed
culture and economic condition.
Id. at 508.
108. See supra note I and accompanying text; see also Ratner, supra note I, at
787-794.
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of the Maryland public school system were inefficient, the state's
Department of Education created the Maryland School Performance
Program (MSPP) to evaluate public school performance. I09 The State
Board of Education initiated the MSPP with the goal of achieving
an effective system of public education by the year 1995. 110 The
purpose of the MSPP is to provide each student with the opportunity
to graduate from Maryland public schools with the information and
skills necessary to participate in a world economy, function as a
responsible citizen in a democratic society, and achieve a personally
satisfying and fulfilling life. III
As a first step toward improving the way Maryland educates its
children, the State Board of Education approved standards by which
to measure the performance of public schools.1I2 Under the MSPP,
school performance is evaluated by measuring the results of the
education process, i.e., actual student performance, rather than focusing on the efforts made to educate.1I3 Excellent school performance
is defined as "a highly challenging and clearly exemplary level of
achievement, indicating outstanding accomplishment in meeting the
needs of students."114 Satisfactory performance is defined as "a
realistic and rigorous level of achievement indicating proficiency in
meeting the needs of students. " liS School performance is measured
by the percentage of a district's. students who meet certain basic
levels of achievement in eight specific areas of performanceY6 The
State Board of Education approved these specific areas of student
109. See The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20, 1990, at AI, col. 1. The Governor and the
General Assembly complained that the school districts "constantly ask for
money without offering evidence that appropriated funds are used wisely." [d.
110. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at iii.
111. [d.
112. [d. The State Superintendent of Schools has expressly stated that the State
Board of Education believes that "public education must ensure success for
all students." [d. (emphasis in original). The MSPP was founded on the belief
that "all children can learn," that "[a]1I children have the right to attend
[public] schools in which they can progress and learn," and that "[a]1I children
shall have a real opportunity to learn equally rigorous content." [d.
113. See id.; see also Ratner, supra note 1, at 787-94. Ratner also points to the
"new catechism of urban school improvement" developed by the late Professor
Ronald Edmonds of Michigan State University which has as its characteristics:
(1) the principal's leadership and attention to the quality of instruction;
(2) a pervasive and broadly understood instructional focus; (3) an
orderly, safe climate conducive to teaching and learning; (4) teacher
behaviors that convey the expectation that all students are expected
to obtain at least minimum mastery; and (5) the use of measures of
pupil achievement as the basis for program evaluation.
[d. at 801.
114. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 5.
115. [d.
116. [d. at 2. See Ratner, supra note 1, at 785-94.
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performance because they are "essential tools for measuring how
well schools, school systems, and the State are preparing every student
for higher education and successful careers, and how well they are
educating every student."lI7 The eight performance areas are separated into three categories: assessed knowledge, student attainment,
and student participation. The specific standards are set forth below.

ASSESSED KNOWLEDGE
Measured by the percentage of 9th grade students who
passed minimum competency tests in basic skills. In the
areas of reading, writing, and mathematics, these tests measure skills equivalent to the eighth grade level: 118
Mathematics
Writing
Citizenship
Reading

Excellent
90070
96%
92%
97%

Satisfactory
80%
90%
85%
95%119

STUDENT ATTAINMENT
Measured by the percentage of students who advance to a
higher grade or instructional level at the end of the year in
grades 1 through 6:
Excellent
98%

Satisfactory
96%120

STUDENT PARTICIPATION
Measured by yearly attendance and dropout rates.
Yearly attendance rates for grades 1 through 12:
Excellent
96%

Satisfactory
94%

Yearly dropout rates for grades 9 through 12:

117. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 1.
118. See School Grading May Revive Funding Suit, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20,
1990, at A12, col. 4.
119. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 5.
120. [d.
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Satisfactory
3%121

Applying these performance standards, the State Board of Education issued Maryland's first outcome-based report on the performance of public schools in November of 1990. 122 This report was
based on school performance for the 1989-90 school year and presents
data on student performance, for which schools, school systems, and
the State are held responsible. 123 In addition to evidence of wide
disparities in spending and educational opportunity, the 1990 MSPP
Report gives children in the Baltimore City School District what the
plaintiffs in Hornbeck did not have - evidence that Maryland's
existing public school financing scheme fails to provide an adequate
education to school children in all districts, as measured by contemporary statewide qualitative standards. l24
According to the 1990 MSPP Report, none of the Maryland
school districts met satisfactory standards in all the performance
areas measured. J2S Statewide, the public school system passed in only
two performance areas: Student Participation as measured by the
yearly attendance rate in grades 1-6, and Student Attainment as
measured by the number of students promoted from one grade to
the next, for grades 1-6. 126 The Maryland public schools failed to
meet satisfactory performance in any area of Assessed Knowledge. 127
The State Board of Education released its second· school performance report on November 12, 1991. 128 The 1991 MSPP Report,
based on the 1990-91 school year, shows that the performance among
students taking minimum competency tests in Assessed Knowledge is
not improving. 129 Statewide, standards again were not met in any

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at iii.
See School Grading May Revive Funding Suit, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20,
1990, at A12, col. 4.
See Md. Issues 'Report Card' on Schools, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 20, 1990,
at AI, col. 1.
1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 8. Maryland's students' satisfactory
participation and advancement in the early years, contrasted with their failure
to achieve basic competency levels in the ninth grade seems to indicate that
there is little correlation between student advancement and achievement of
basic competency. Because students' performance worsens the longer they stay
in school, it seems that the Maryland public school system is failing to meet
the needs of its students.
Id.
1991 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20.
Id. at 10.
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area of Assessed Knowledge. 130 Ninety-eight percent of elementary
school students, however, were promoted from one grade to the
next, resulting in an excellent promotion rate for the State. l3l Yet,
as measured by 9th and 10th graders taking minimum competency
tests in Assessed Knowledge for the first time, only the Cecil County
district met minimum standards in Reading, Writing and Math.132
The 1991 MSPP Report also indicates that, for the second year
in a row, 11 th graders in eight districts failed to meet state minimum
competency standards in Assessed Knowledge as measured at about
the eighth grade level. 133 The districts failing minimum competency
standards in Assessed Knowledge for second time test-takers were:
Baltimore City, and Prince George's, Caroline, St. Mary's, Somerset,
Talbot, and Garrett counties. l34 In 1983, four of these districts were
among the plaintiffs in Hornbeck. 13S Ironically, with the exception
of Baltimore City, all of the districts failing minimum competency
standards in Assessed Knowledge at the high school level had excellent
or satisfactory promotion from one grade to the next at the elementary school level,136
The 1990 MSPP Report evidences that, in school districts where
more money is available, students are likely to perform better .137 The

130. [d.
131. [d.
132. [d. at 26.
133. [d.
134. [d. at 16, 22-52.
135. See Hornbeck, 295 Md. 597,458 A.2d 758 (Somerset, Caroline, and St. Mary's
counties, and the School Commissioners of Baltimore City).
136. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 22, 28, 34, 44, 48, SO, 52.
137. See School 'Grading' Only a First Step, The Baltimore Evening Sun, Nov. 20,
1990, at 01, col. 4 (quoting State School Superintendent Shilling as stating
that issuing the performance data means thCit "we're going to be in a position
to show how money makes a difference, and be able to show improved student
achievement").
While there is no simple correlation between dollars spent and achievement,
educational experts answer the question of whether money can make a difference in the affirmative. Robert E. Slavin, Center for Research on Effective
Schooling for Disadvantaged Students, Johns Hopkins University, states that
many programs and practices, which cost money to implement, have been
shown to have positive effects on student achievement. Spring 1991 MEC
Newsletter, supra note 24, at 3-4. Slavin points out that some of the best
researched and proven programs and practices which translate increased financing into effective education for children include: (I) Early Education good quality preschool and extended day kindergarten programs are known to
"markedly increase" the chances of students' success by providing the language
and school skills necessary so that disadvantaged children do not fall behind
in early grades; for example, Maryland's own Success for All program, also
used in other states, which uses preschool, extended-day kindergarten, one-toone tutoring, family support services, and staff development, has been found
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Anne Arundel County School District, for example, spent $4,889 per
student in 1989-90 and passed in only two performance areas. 138 The
Baltimore County School District spent $5,722 per student and passed
in four performance areas. 139 The Howard County School District
spent $5,549 per student, and passed in seven out of the eight
performance areas. l40
. When compared to wealthier school districts, the performance
of Baltimore City schools is especially inadequate. The poorer urban
Baltimore City School District, which was able to spend only $4,255
per student in 1989-90,141 and $4,614 per student in 1990-91,142 failed
in every area of Assessed Knowledge measured by the 1990 MSPP.
Therefore, students in Baltimore City as a whole have not achieved
the basic competency in mathematics, writing, citizenship and reading
required for graduation from high school in Maryland. 143
In examining the failure of the Maryland public school system
to provide adequate education to children throughout the state, it is
important to recognize the disparity in the degree of inadequacies

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

to ensure that virtually all children, regardless of home background, achieve
success in reading; (2) Staff Development and Curriculum - increasing the
effectiveness of today's teachers in the classroom has the most impact in the
near term; (3) Improving Teacher Quality - over the long term, underfunded
school districts will never employ the best teachers unless they have the funds
to attract and retain them; (4) Improving Library Services - research shows
that children learn to read by reading what is interesting to them; extracurricular
reading is essential to an effective reading program and children must have
access to extensive libraries with trained librarians who are able to coordinate
students and teachers with an adequate number, variety and quality of reading
material; (5) Improving Family Support Services - because many family problems impact on a child's educational success, someone at the school must make
sure that students attend school, have eyeglasses and other health care, and to
involve parents in support of their children's success; (6) Improving Access to
Advanced Coursework - in a concern for students at risk, disadvantaged school
districts often are unable to provide advanced placement courses for students
who need them; (7) Improving Vocational and Technical Education - vocational
and technical education in underfunded districts is inadequate to prepare
students for today's job market; in order for the money spent on such programs
to be worthwhile, higher quality technical and vocational education, including
providing all high school students with some degree of computer literacy is
imperative. Id. Slavin conCludes that Baltimore City is clearly deficient in a
broad range of services to students and states that "if students in poorer
districts are to have any chance to meet the high and comprehensive performance standards established by the State of Maryland, there is no question but
that major additional funds will be needed." Id. at 4.
1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 12-13.
Id. at 16-17.
[d. at 36-37.
[d. at 14-15.
1991 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 17.
See 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.

456

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 20

among the districts. l44 For the 1989-90 school year, in the Baltimore
City School District only 43.30/0 of students passed mathematics,
67.3% passed writing, 61.4% passed citizenship, and 85% passed
reading. 145 While the Anne Arundel County School District achieved
satisfactory performance in student participation for attendance in
grades 1-6, and excellent performance for the number of students
promoted to the next grade level, it was also very close to meeting
satisfactory performance. l46 The Anne Arundel School District missed
yearly attendance in grades 7-12 by only 1.6%, reading by 1.1 %,
mathematics by 8.3%, writing by 4% and citizenship by 14.6%.J4'
The dropout rate for Anne Arundel high school students, however,
was an unsatisfactory 5.9%.148 Similarly, the Baltimore County School
District passed reading, writing, and student participation in grades
1-6, and achieved excellent performance in the promotion rate for
grades 1_6. 149 The district barely missed satisfactory performance in
other areas: attendance in grades 7-12 by only 1.3%, mathematics
by 2.8%, and citizenship by 4.5%.150 Although the dropout rate in
Baltimore County was over one and one-half times higher than
satisfactory, at 4.8%, this rate is more than 20% lower than the
dropout rate in Anne Arundel County, and 75% lower than the
dropout rate in Baltimore City. lSI In Howard County, the only
performance standard not met was attendance in grades 7-12, which
was missed by only 1% .152
The disparity in the degree of inadequacies is particularly striking
when the Baltimore City and Montgomery County school districts
are compared. As the wealthiest district, Montgomery County was
able to spend $6,629 per student in 1989-90, and obtained satisfactory
achievement in all the basic skills tested: 1S3 80.3% of the students in
that district passed mathematics, 92.2% passed writing and 95.3%

144. See Ratner, supra note 1.
145. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 40. In 1990-91, Baltimore City's
performance remained unsatisfactory, with a decline of about 5 points in
Writing and Citizenship, and only slight improvement in mathematics and
reading: 44.3 percent of students passed mathematics, 62.4 percent passed
writing, 57.1 percent passed citizenship, and 86.1 percent passed reading. 1991
MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
146. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 12.
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. [d. at 16.
150. [d.
151. [d. at 12, 14, 16.
152. [d. at 36.
153. [d. at 40-41. Montgomery County students were not tested on citizenship
because the students in that district would not have been first time test takers
on that subject. [d. at 40.
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passed reading. 154 The only performance standard not met by the
Montgomery County School District was attendance in grades 7-12.155
Scoring 92.1070, the district missed satisfactory performance in this
area by only 1.9% .156 In comparison, the Baltimore City School
District also failed attendance in grades 7-12, but missed satisfactory
performance by a significant 14.6%.157 In addition, the dropout rate
in the Montgomery County School District was a mere 2.9%;158 in
Baltimore City the dropout rate was more than six times as great at
18.8%y9
The 1991 MSPP Report shows that "Baltimore City continues
to exist in a category all its own."I60 According to the 1991 MSPP
Report, Baltimore City was the only district to fail all four areas of
Assessed Knowledge and elementary promotion. 161 The Anne Arundel
and Somerset districts also failed all four areas of Assessed Knowledge; however, they both achieved excellent and satisfactory elementary promotion rates. l62 Although the 1991 MSPP Report indicates
that Baltimore City's dropout rate declined from 18.8% to 10.3%,
city officials believe the actual figure should be 14.6%.163

154. Id. at 40. In 1990-91, Montgomery County showed slight improvement in
mathematics and reading, but fell below satisfactory by 2 percent in writing:
81.1 percent of the students passed mathematics, 88.0 percent passed writing,
85.0 percent passed citizenship and 96.0 percent passed reading. 1991 MSPP
REpORT, supra note 20, at 42.
155. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 40.
156. Id. In 1990-91 attendance in grades 7-12 was slightly improved in Montgomery
County at 92.5 percent. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 42.
157. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 14. In 1990-91, Baltimore City had a
79.4 percent attendance rate in grades 7-12. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note
20, at 16.
158. 1990 MSPP REPORT, supra note 20, at 40. In 1990-91, Montgomery County's
dropout rate improved to 2.1 percent. 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at
42.
159. 1990 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 14. Baltimore City's highest score,
91.1 "10 was in the promotion rate of children in grades 1-6. Id. at 40. The
drastic change in student participation between elementary school and high
school may be attributed to a failure of the system. See Robinson v. Cahill,
118 N.J. Super. 223, 251-52, 287 A.2d 187,202, a/I'd on rehearing, 119 N.J.
Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson
I), aff'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson 11), cert.denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973). In 1990-91, Baltimore City's dropout rate showed improvement at 10.3%, 1991 MSPP REpORT, supra note 20, at 16, although city
officials believe that figure should be higher. Report Card Gives Schools Credit
For Trying Harder, The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 3, 1991, at lA, col. 2.
160. Report Card Gives Schools Credit For Trying Harder, The Baltimore Sun,
Nov. 3, 1991, at AI, col. 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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The Baltimore City School District's continued unsatisfactory
performance can be explained, in part, by its demographics and by
the lesser amount of money it spends per student compared with
wealthier districts such as Montgomery County.l64 In 1990-91, Baltimore City was able to spend only $4,614 per student, while Montgomery County spent over $7,000 per student. 165 Of Baltimore City'S
108,000 students, over half live in poverty. 166
The performance of Baltimore City, particularly as compared to
the wealthier districts, shows that the General Assembly has failed
to meet its constitutional obligation to provide an adequate statewide
public education. The Hornbeck court held that the constitutional
obligation to provide an adequate education does not require the
General Assembly to finance and operate the public school system
uniformly in every district. 167 However, where the General Assembly
has failed to finance a public school system sufficient for· students
in all districts to meet even the State's own qualitative standards of
basic education,l68 there can be little doubt that compliance with the
"thorough and efficient" clause of article VIII has not been met.
III. COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDARD OF ADEQUATE EDUCATION WITH OTHER
JURISDICTIONS INDICATES THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCING BASED ON LOCAL WEALTH IS INSUFFICIENT
TO MEET THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED LEVEL
OF EDUCATION.
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions confirm that public school
financing schemes based on local wealth fail to provide an adequate
public education throughout the state. The Hornbeck court considered cases from other jurisdictions with state constitutions containing
a "thorough and efficient" education clause or like provision. 169 The

164.
165.
166.
167.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 631-39, 458 A.2d
758, 776-80 (1983).
168. Cf. id.
169. Id. at 632-39, 458 A.2d at 776-80. Forty-nine state constitutions contain some
type of education clause mandating that the state maintain a free public
education. Note, To Render them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639,
1662 n.102 (1989) (citing Ratner, A New Legal Duty For Urban Public Schools:
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REv. 777, 814 n.138 (1985».
State education clauses can be divided into four different categories. Id. at
1662-70. In contrast to the last three categories, the first category of state
education clauses provide only for a free system of public schools, without
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court· correctly read these cases as supporting its holding that a
any mention of standard of quality whatsoever. Id. at 1662 n.107. Challenges
to public school financing under Category I education clauses have, for varying
reasons, been rejected by state courts. Id. Under Category I education clauses,
apparently, the state mandate is met so long as the state establishes some
system of free public schools. Id.
In Board of Education v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1982); appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983), the New York Court of Appeals interpreted a
Category I education clause. It held that the education article of the New York
Constitution, which requires that the legislature "provide for the maintenance
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of
this state may be educated," was satisfied, as there existed a "system of free
schools" which offered a "sound basic education" to the state's children. Id.
at 47-49, 439 N.E.2d 368-69, 453 N.Y .S.2d 643. The court found no support
in either the language of the constitution or the historical documentation of
the 1894 New York Constitutional Convention to support the contention that
the education article required equality of education throughout the state. Id.
Maryland's education clause falls under the second category of state
education clauses. Note, To Render Them Safe, supra, at 1663 n.llO. Category
II clauses mandate that the system of public schools meet a certain minimum
standard of quality, such as "thorough and efficient." Id. at 1663. Nineteen
states have Category II education clauses. Id. at 1663 n.llO. In addition to
Maryland, five states have "thorough and efficient" clauses: Minnesota, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia; three states require "thorough"
systems: Colorado, Idaho, and Montana; and five states require "efficient"
systems: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Texas. [d. at n.III. Five
other Category II states do not have language specifically using either "thorough" or "efficient": Florida, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Id. Virginia, for example, calls for "an educational program of high quality."
Id.
In 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court set the benchmark for a
thorough and efficient public school system in Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va.
672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). It held that education is a fundamental right under
the state equality provisions, and stated that a thorough and efficient public
school system "develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the
minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically."
Id. at 705, 255 S.E.2d at 877. According to the Pauley court, a thorough and
efficient education is one that encompasses the development of: (1) literacy;
(2) basic math skills; (3) the ability to make informed political choices; (4) the
ability to understand the life choices available; (5) vocational training; (6)
knowledge of recreational pursuits; (7) knowledge of the creative arts such as
music, literature, and theater; and (8) social ethics. Id. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at
878.
In Hornbeck, the Court of Appeals of Maryland distinguished Pauley on
the ground that, at the time the case was decided, West Virginia, like New
Jersey, had not "established comprehensive statewide qualitative standards
governing all facets of the educational process in the State's public elementary
and secondary schools," by legislation, regulations and bylaws adopted by the
State Board of Education. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. See
infra notes 201-254 and accompanying text for a discussion of education
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thorough and efficient system of schools does not require uniform
financing in New Jersey.
Eight states have Category III education clauses. Note, To Render Them
Safe, supra, at 1666 n.118. Category III education clauses appear to impose
greater obligations on the state than Category II clauses. [d. at 1667. But
because these clauses have yet to be interpreted by state courts in the context
of public school financing, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the legal
implications of their different language. [d. For instance, although involving
a Category III education clause, the California Supreme Court ruling in Serrano
v. Priest that unequal public school fil1ancing violated the California Constitution, discussed supra note 9, was ultimately decided under state equal
protection guarantees.
The remaining states fall into Category IV. [d. at 1667 n.123. Category
IV education clauses are said to impose the greatest obligation on states,
typically providing that education is fundamental, primary or paramount. [d.
at 1667-68. Category IV clauses have not been subject to much litigation. /d.
at n.I24.
The two cases considering Category IV clauses, Seattle School District No.
1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978), and McDaniel v. Thomas,
248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981) have reached differing conclusions. Note,
To Render Them Safe, supra, at 1667-68 n.124. In McDaniel, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that Georgia Constitution art. VIII § 1, which states
that "[t]he provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be
a primary obligation of the State of Georgia," does not "require the state to
equalize educational opportunities." 248 Ga. 635, 643, 285 S.E.2d 156, 164.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Washington found that Washington
Constitution art. IX § 1, which provides that it is "the paramount duty of the
state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within
its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste,
or sex," imposes a duty on the state, and concluded that the state system of
school financing during the school year 1975-76 did not comply with the
constitutional mandate to provide ample provision for education. Seattle School
District No.1, 90 Wash. 2d at 511-14, 585 P.2d at 91-92.
Interestingly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington in Seattle
School District No. 1 expressly overruled its earlier decision in Northshore
School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 727-31, 530 P.2d 178,
201-03 (1974), in which the court held that the public school financing scheme
did not violate either the state equality or education clauses. Using reasoning
similar to that of the Hornbeck court, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780, the
Kinnear court stated that "[t]here was no evidence that any child had been
deprived of accreditation, promotion or admission to other schools because his
district failed to meet state standards or that any student ... had been forced
to bring suit to compel his district to provide classes that met state standards."
84 Wash. 2d at 694-95, 530 P .2d at 184. One commentator has suggested that
had the Kinnear plaintiffs been able to demonstrate that such a suit had been
filed, they would have prevailed. Note, To Render Them Safe, supra, at 1669
n.135 (citation omitted).
While not discussing Seattle School District No.1, the Hornbeck court
did consider McDaniel. 295 Md. at 637, 458 A.2d at 779. The Hornbeck court
noted that "the [McDaniel] court concluded from the evidence that a direct
relationship existed between a district's level of funding and the educational
opportunities which a school district was able to provide its children." [d.
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spending yo Since Hornbeck, however, several states which have·
considered public school financing schemes dependent upon local
wealth, in light of state constitutional mandates to provide thorough
and/or efficient public education, have held such financing schemes
unconstitutionaL 171
In 1984, the superintendent of San Antonio's impoverished Edgewood School District persuaded activists to challenge the public
school financing scheme under the Texas Constitution. 172 In 1989,
sixteen years after the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez,173 a unanimous Supreme Court of Texas held in Edgewood

170.
171.

172.
173.

(citation omitted). The Hornbeck court stated that, nonetheless, under McDaniel, local districts are not restricted from "doing what they can to improve
educational opportunities within the district," nor does the Georgia education
clause "require the state to equalize educational opportunities." [d. (citations
omitted). The Hornbeck court further noted that the McDaniel court found
that the Georgia Legislature had not disregarded its obligation to provide an
"adequate" education. [d. (citations omitted).
In the context of public school financing, the ultimate question is the saine
whether the state education clause falls into Category II, III, or IV. The court
must ask whether the standard of quality imposed by the state constitution
mandates public school financing reform. See Note, To Render Them Safe,
supra, at 1663 n.111, 1667 n.121, 1668 n.I24. In determining whether that
constitutional standard of quality has been met, however, it is logical for a
court to place greater reliance on cases interpreting the exact same constitutional
language than on cases interpreting language which is clearly different. [d.
Within the last few years, four Category II states have found their public
school financing schemes unconstitutional under state constitutions using language virtually the same as that in the Maryland education clause: New Jersey
(thorough and efficient); Montana (thorough); Texas and Kentucky (efficient).
See supra note 162.
See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
(courts may and should involve themselves in defining the standards of con·
stitutionally mandated thorough and efficient system of education) (citing the
landmark case of Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979»;
Helena Elementary School Dist. No.1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684
(1989), opinion amended, 236 Mont. 44, 784 P.2d 412 (1990); Abbott v. Burke,
119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989).
Twenty-four states have considered state constitutional challenges to public
school financing schemes based on local wealth. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 31415, 575 A.2d at 373. Nine states have held such a financing scheme invalid
under their state education article. [d.; see also Note, Unfulfilled Promises,
infra note 190, at 1072. Three of these states have also determined that such
a scheme also violated equal protection guarantees. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 31415, 575 A.2d at 373. A tenth state, California, held that such a scheme violated
only state equal protection guarantees. [d. Fourteen states, including Maryland,
have thus far rejected both constitutional claims. [d. See generally Briffault,
supra note 22, at 24-39.
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 14, 1991, at 30-31.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Independent School District v. Kirbyl74 that the Texas public school
financing scheme violated a provision of the Texas Constitution
requiring the maintenance of an "efficient" system of public schools
so as to achieve "general diffusion of knowledge."17s The Edgewood
court found that "efficient" conveyed the meaning of "effective"
or "productive of results," 176 and that evidence of the disparity in
financial and educational resources among school districts clearly
indicated that the legislature's good faith efforts were insufficient to
meet the constitutionally mandated level of education 177 under a
public school financing scheme dependent upon local wealth. 178 The
court held that the legislature must provide a public school financing
scheme in which the districts would have "substantially equal access
to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort. "179 The
Edgewood court reasoned· that, under the Texas Constitution, the
state legislature, not local government, is obligated to provide for an
efficient system of public education. l80 The court stated: "Whether
the legislature acts directly or enlists local government to help meet
its obligation, the end product must still be what the constitution
commands, i.e., an efficient system of public free schools throughout
the state." 181
Unfortunately, two legislative attempts to cure the defective
financing scheme have also been rejected as unconstitutional. In a
continuation of the Kirby case, the Supreme Court of Texas found
that, as the first modification to the state education financing scheme
preserved reliance on local property taxes as the primary source of
funds, the new system also violated the efficiency requirement of the
education clause. 182 After four special legislative sessions, a new
education funding law was passed only four days before a special
master would have taken control of the state's public school financing
system under the initial Kirby decision. 183 The new system equalized
funding; however, because this was accomplished by creating special
taxing districts whose property tax rates were controlled by the state
legislature, the act was struck down as an unconstitutional state ad
valorem tax. 184
174. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), a/I'd, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
175. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397.
176. Id. at 395.
177. Id. at 397.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 397-98.
181. Id. at 398.
182. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
183. Sherman, supra note 22, at I.
184. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Ind. School Dist. v. Edgewood Ind. School Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
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Contemporaneous with the initial Edgewood decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc. "SS found that the Kentucky General Assembly's efforts to provide an "efficient system of common schools," as mandated by the
Kentucky Constitution, had failed under a financing scheme based
on local wealth.ls6 The Rose court held that Kentucky's entire system
of public schools, including the method of financing, was unconstitutional. IS? The Rose court held that the General Assembly must
adequately finance public schools in a manner which assures that the
ultimate control over efficient education remains with the legislature. ISS The Rose court reasoned that no other decision was possible
due to the overall inadequacy of Kentucky'S public school system,
the great disparity in educational opportunity throughout the state,

185. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
186. [d. at 194-99, 213. After reviewing the landmark case of Pauley v. Kelly, 162
W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979), in which the Supreme Court of West
Virginia adopted a definition of "thorough and efficient" after extensive
historical analysis involving a thorough examination of other state education
clauses, the Rose court explained its interpretation of "efficient:"
In defining 'efficient,' we use all the tools made available· to us. In
spite of protestations to the contrary, we do not engage in judicial
legislating. We do not make policy. We do not substitute our judgment
for that of the General Assembly. We simply take the plain directive
of the constitution, and armed with its purpose, we decide what our
General Assembly must achieve in complying with its solemn constitutional duty.
Any system of common schools must be created and maintained
with the premise that education is absolutely vital to the present and
future of our Commonwealth ....
The sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools
is that of our General Assembly ....
The General Assembly must not only establish the system, but it
must monitor it on a continuing basis so that it will always be
maintained in a constitutional manner. The state must carefully supervise it, so that there is no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level.

The system of common schools must be adequately funded to
achieve its goals (emphasis added). The system of common schools
must be substantially uniform throughout the state. Each child, every
child, in this Commonwealth must be provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education (emphasis in original). Equality
is the key word here. The children of the poor and the children of
the rich, the children who live in the poor districts and the children
who live in the rich districts must be given the same opportunity and
access to an adequate education. This obligation cannot be shifted to
local counties and local school districts.
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 2110.
187. [d. at 215.
188. [d. at 216.
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and the great disparity and inadequacy of local financial effort
throughout the state. 189
The Rose court did not tell the General Assembly how to provide
adequate financing for the public school system, only that it must
do so efficiently, based on the court's interpretation of the Kentucky
Constitution. The court did state, however, that if ad valorem taxes
on real and personal property were implemented, the General Assembly would have the obligation to ensure that taxed property was
assessed at "100% of its market fair value," and that tax rates
would be uniform. 1OO
The Rose court viewed its decision as an opportunity for the
General Assembly to "launch the Commonwealth into a new era of
educational opportunity which will insure a strong economic, cultural,
and political future." Unlike other state legislatures which appear
uncooperative in response to court orders for improved public school
financing,191 the Kentucky General Assembly complied with the Rose
court's order without resistance. 192 Kentucky taxpayers agreed, without protest, to provide an additional 2.5 billion dollars to the public
school system. 193 In the words of former Kentucky Governor Bert
Coombs, "there was a feeling among the people ... that the time
had come when they had to do something about their school system
or ... we would always remain a mediocre state." 194
Also in 1989, the Supreme Cou-rt of Montana unanimously ruled,
in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,19S that the
Montana constitutional provision that "[e]quality of education opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state," is to be
construed according to the plain meaning of its words. l96 Because
the court found that "spending disparities among the State's school
districts translate into a denial of equality of educational opportu189. Id. at 213. In contrast to Texas, the Kentucky Legislature cooperated with the
court order to increase financing for economically disadvantaged children.
According to Bert Coombs, lead plaintiff's counsel and former Governor of
Kentucky, "the legislature faced up to the mandate and did enact what has
been called the most enlightened and revolutionary change in schools in this
country." Sherman, supra note 182, at 1.
190. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216.
191. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1 (discussing the apparent noncooperation of state
legislatures in New Jersey, Kentucky and Montana); see generally Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 1072 (1991) (arguing that legislative inertia and unwarranted judicial
deference to the political branches in the remedial phase hinder the plaintiff's
prospects for securing a constitutional remedy).
192. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
196. Id. at 52-53, 769 P.2d at 689.
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nity," it held that "excessive reliance" on local revenues for public
school financing was unconstitutional. I97 Ironically, in 1974 this same
court had unanimously upheld the state's public school financing
scheme under the rational basis test. 198 Fifteen years after this decision, and shortly after vetoing the legislature's initial response to the
Helena Elementary School District decision, new state financing
provisions were enacted. l99 As a result, Montana provided an additional 100 million dollars to its public school system, boosting state
support for public schools from thirty-five percent to seventy-eight
percent. 200
Of particular relevance to a renewed constitutional challenge to
the Maryland public school financing scheme is a change in New
Jersey law which established statewide qualitative standards for New
Jersey Public Schools. 101 The Hornbeck court distinguished the New
Jersey Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Robinson v. Cahilp02 on the
basis that New Jersey had no law establishing qualitative standards
for public schools.203 This change in New Jersey's law renders moot
the Hornbeck court's efforts to distinguish Robinson. 204
Similar to the plaintiffs in Hornbeck, the Robinson plaintiffs
were children from poorer districts who raised a constitutional challenge to the state's public school financing scheme.lOs As in Maryland,
the New Jersey public school financing scheme depended heavily on
the financial resources of each local school district,206 and incontrovertible evidence demonstrated that the existing financing scheme

197. [d. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690.
198. See State ex reI. Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 153, 520 P.2d 776, 783,
cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); see also Note, To Render Them Sale, supra
note 168, at 1665 n.1I4 (proposing that the opposite outcomes "may be
attributed to changing financial realities, the demonstrated ineffectiveness of a
system that was relatively new in 1974, and the replacement of all but one of
the justices on the court.").
199. Sherman, supra note 182, at I.
200. [d.

201. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to 7A-52 (West 1989).
202. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 236-56, 287 A.2d 187, 194-204, a/I'd on rehearing, 119
N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273,
(Robinson I), a/I'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson 11),
cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
.
203. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 638-39, 458
A.2d 758, 779-80 (1983).
204. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cerl. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
205. Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 227-29, 287 A.2d at 189.
206. [d. at 229-31, 287 A.2d at 190-91 (local taxes furnished 6711Jo of public school
costs). For the 1986-87 fiscal year, the average state public school finance
system reli:d on local revenues for 43.9 percent of its budget. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR Eouc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF Eouc., DIGEST OF Eouc.
STATISTICS 1989, at 149.
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fostered excessive financial disparities. 207 Additionally, the Robinson
court was required to interpret the New Jersey Constitution, which,
much like the Maryland Constitution, provides:
The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools for the instruction of all the children in the State
between the ages of five and eighteen years.lOS
As in Hornbeck, the trial court in Robinson held that, because
of the resulting disparities among the various school districts with
respect to their ability to finance education, the state's public school
financing scheme violated equal protection guarantees. 209 Unlike
Hornbeck, the trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal, but on
the ground that New Jersey's public school financing scheme violated
the thorough and efficient clause of the state constitution. 210
The Robinson court found that the constitutional guarantee of
a "thorough and efficient" education required equality of expenditures for the minimum mandated educational opportunity needed to
equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the
labor market of contemporary society. 211 The court stated that "if
the State chooses to assign its obligation . . . to local government,
the State . . . must compel the local school districts to raise the
money necessary to provide that educational opportunity. 212
After the 1973 decision in Robinson, the question of the constitutionality of New Jersey's public school financing scheme continued through the New Jersey courts before it eventually became the
impetus for legislative response. Initially, the Robinson court deferred
remedial action to allow the New Jersey Legislature time to enact
satisfactory financing legislation. 213 This time was extended in 1975. 214
Subsequently, however, in the absence of legislative action, the court
authorized a provisional remedy to effectuate the constitutional entitlement to a thorough and efficient system of public schools.21s
Only then did the New Jersey Legislature take action to correct the
public school financing scheme. Before the judicial remedies became
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 235-46, 287 A.2d at 193-99.
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, 1 I.
Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 276-80, 287 A.2d at 215-16.
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515-19, 303 A.2d 273, 295-97 (Robinson I),
a/I'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson II), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976.
See Robinson I, 62 N.J. at SIS, 303 A.2d at 295.
Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297 (emphasis in original).
Robinson II, 63 N.J. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66.
Robinson V. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 37, 335 A.2d 6, 7 (1975) (Robinson III).
Robinson V. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 147-51,351 A.2d 713, 718-22 (Robinson IV),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
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effective, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Public School
Education Act of 1975. 216 The Robinson court then found that, as a
result of the incorporation of statewide qualitative standards of
education, the 1975 Act was in facial compliance with the "thorough
and efficient" clause.217
The statewide qualitative standards adopted by the New Jersey
Legislature parallel those adopted by the Maryland State Board of
Education in the Maryland School Performance Program. 218 The
1975 Act defines a thorough and efficient system of public schools
as one which provides all children, "regardless of socioeconomic
status or geographic location, the educational opportunity which will
prepare them to function politically, economically, and socially in a
democratic society.' '219
The Robinson court specifically reserved judgment on the question of whether the 1975 Act would pass constitutional muster as
applied to any individual school district,220 but upheld the 1975 Act
as constitutional, assuming it was fully funded. 221 In fact, the Robinson court went so far as to point out that there is a significant
connection between the amount of money spent and the quality of

216. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7A-I to 7A-52 (West 1989).
217. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467-68, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (1976) (per curiam)
(Robinson JI).

218. In addition to defining the general goal of a thorough and efficient education,
the New Jersey Legislature specifically acknowledged the major elements of
the State's obligations:
a.
Establishment of educational goals at both the state and local
levels;
b.
Encouragement of public involvement in the establishment of
educational goals;
c.
Instruction intended to produce attainment of reasonable levels
of proficiency in the basic communications and computational
skills;
d.
A breadth of program offerings designed to develop the individual talents and abilities of pupils;
e.
Programs and supportive services for all pupils especially those
who are educationally disadvantaged or who have special educational needs;
f.
Adequately equipped, sanitary and secure physical facilities, and
adequate materials and supplies;
g.
Qualified instructional and other personnel;
h.
Efficient administrative procedures;
i.
An adequate State program of research and development; and
j.
Evaluation and monitoring programs at both the State and local
levels.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-5 (West 1989).
219. [d. at § 18A:7A-4.
220. Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 455, 355 A.2d at 131-32.
221. [d. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139.
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educational opportunity. 222 Perhaps it should come as no surprise
then that the legal challenge spawned in Robinson lasted for more
than a decade; in the end, the incorporation of statewide qualitative
standards for thorough and efficient education· was not enough to
keep New Jersey's public school financing scheme from being found
unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban districts when the public
financing scheme continued to be dependent upon local wealth.223
By 1990, it had become abundantly clear to the New Jersey
courts that, without sufficient State money. education had failed in
the poorer urban school districts. 224 In response. the Supreme Court
of New Jersey unanimously held in Abbott v. Burke22S that, despite
the acknowledged efforts of the legislature. the Public School Education Act of 1975 approved in Robinson had failed to accomplish
the goal of a thorough and efficient education for all public school
children. 226
The Abbott court expressly stated that the thorough and efficient
clause did not require an equal dollar amount to be spent per
student. 227 To achieve the equality required by the thorough and
efficient clause. however. all school districts must attain minimum
substantive standards. 22s The number of dollars spent per student is
relevant only if it impacts on the substantive education offered in a
given district. 229
222. Id. at 481, 355 A.2d at 145-46.
223. See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (1990). The
Robinson I court recognized the great discrepancies between local needs and
local fiscal capacities, noting that there was no correlation between the local
tax base, and the "number of pupils to be educated, or the number of poor
to be housed and clothed and fed, or the incidence of crime and juvenile
delinquency, or the cost of police or fire protection, to the demands of the
judicial process." Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 501, 303 A.2d 273, 287
(Robinson I), afl'd on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinson 11),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The court stated that there may have been
some rough correlation in the past, but added that "[s]urely that is not true
today in our state." Id. Though acknowledging the cost of local control in
terms of inequality in resources and spending, the Robinson I court rejected
the contention that the local control could be satisfied without local control
of financing. Id. at 499-500, 303 A.2d at 286-87. Abbott clearly shows that
treating local control of public school financing as essential to effective local
government is at best illusory, and that reform is required to allow more
effective control for all districts.
224. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363.
225. 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
226. Id. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363.
227. Id. at 305, 575 A.2d at 368.
228. Id. (stating the equality required by Robinson was "based on ~he proposition
that the Constitution required a certain level of education, that which equates
with thorough and efficient").
229. Id. at 309, 575 A.2d at 370.
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In Abbott, school children from Camden, East Orange, Jersey
City and Irvington 230 contended that the thorough and efficient clause
of the New Jersey Constitution requires substantial equality in educational financing. 231 The plaintiffs claimed that the 1975 Act as
applied was systematically productive of financial and educational
disparities which rendered the entire Act unconstitutional,232 or at
least as applied to specific districts or a specific class of districts. 233
In support of this claim, the plaintiffs presented evidence of substantial disparity in expenditures and educational input between the
poorest and richest districts. 234
The State argued that statistical evidence fails to prove that a
significant relationship exists between education expenditures and
property wealth. 235 The State further argued that money is not a
critical factor in the quality of education. 236 The State asserted that
disparity in financing does not establish the failure to provide thorough and efficient education, nor does it establish any consequent
disparity in substantive education. 237
The Abbott court responded by observing that the issues involved
questions of educational theory debated over the years, and that the
only thing universally agreed upon was that urban schools are failing. 238
The court held that, in order to meet the constitutionally mandated level of education, public school financing
cannot be allowed to depend on the ability of local school
districts to tax, but had to be guaranteed and mandated by
the State, and that the level of financing had to be adequate
to provide for the special educational needs of poor urban
230. [d. at 296, 575 A.2d at 363. In 1981, Marilyn Morheuser, Director of the
Education Law Center in Newark, brought suit on behalf of the four innercity school districts, claiming that New Jersey's complicated public school
financing scheme actually increased the disparities between wealthy and poor
school districts. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1. In August 1988, an administrative law judge agreed and rejected the State's argument that poorer district's
had caused their own financial problems by inadequate management efforts.
Even before the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in Abbott, the newly elected
Governor of New Jersey, James Florio, became the first governor in the
country to declare a public school financing system based on local wealth
inequitable, and promised more money for poorer school districts. [d.
231. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 301, 575 A.2d at 366.
232. [d.
233. [d.
234. [d.
235. [d. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403. But see Briffault, supra note 22, at 27.
236. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 376, 575 A.2d at 403.
237. [d. at 376, 575 A.2d at 403-04. But see Briffault, supra note 22, at 27.
238. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 376-77, 575 A.2d at 404.
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districts in order to redress their extreme disadvantages. 239
The court then held the 1975 Act unconstitutional as applied to
poorer urban school districts,240 and ordered the 1975 Act amended
to assure financing of education in poorer districts substantially equal
to that of the wealthier districts. 241
Disparity in public school financing was an important factor in
the Abbott court's conclusion that the education provided for students in poorer urban districts would not enable them to compete
with their suburban colleagues or to function effectively as citizens
in society.242 While disparity alone did not render the 1975 Act
unconstitutional, the court found disparity of financing relevant to
its constitutional conclusion.243 This conclusion was based not only
on the court's finding of a substantive defect in the quality of
education in the poorer urban districts but was based also on the
significant disparity of spending between the poorer urban districts
and the wealthier districts. 244 The Abbott court observed that
"[w]hatever else the evidence shows, it is clear that in' New Jersey
today, as we assume in the United States, the greater the students'
needs, the less their education"245 and that "[t]heir deprivation is
real, of constitutional magnitude, and not blunted in the least by the
State's statistical analysis.' '246
Abbott flatly rejects the argument that the establishment of
statewide qualitative standards governing the educational process247
is alone sufficient to meet the constitutional mandate for a thorough
and efficient system of public schools. The Abbott court focused on
the fact that, even with qualitative standards of education under the
1975 Act, "[e]ducation has failed [in the poorer urban school districts] for both the students and the State."248 The court recognized
that, under a public school financing scheme dependent upon local
wealth, "the evidence compels but one conclusion: the poorer the
district and the greater its need, the less money available, and the

239. [d. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363.
240. [d.
241. [d. The court's remedy left the expenditure disparity intact, so long as it did
not interfere with the right of the poorer districts to receive a thorough and
efficient education. [d.
242. [d. at 382-83, 575 A.2d at 407.
243. [d.
244. [d. at 383, 575 A.2d at 407.
245. [d. at 319, 575 A.2d at 375.
246. [d. at 347, 575 A.2d at 389.
247. But c/. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 639, 458
A.2d 758, 780 (1983).
248. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363.
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worse the education. That system is neither thorough or [sic] efficient. "249
In reaching its conclusion, the Abbott court was aware that
money alone would not achieve the constitutional mandate of a
thorough and efficient education in the poorer urban districts. 25o The
court refused to ignore the fact that the existing educational programs
in poorer schools were not designed to meet, nor were they sufficiently addressing, the pervasive array of problems that inhibit the
education of poorer urban children. 2s1 Regardless of how much money
was spent, these schools could not provide a thorough and efficient
education without educational reform. 2S2 Nonetheless, the court also
refused to discount the rights of school children in poorer urban
districts simply because they were disadvantaged by accident of their
environment, compounded by an inadequate education.2S3 Where the
state had compounded the wrong, it must provide a remedy. 254 As
Chief Judge Wilnetz eloquently stated:
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable
the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are entitled
to pass or fail with at least the same amount of money as
their competitors.
If the claim is that these students simply cannot make it,
the constitutional answer is, give them a chance. The Constitution does not tell them that since more money will not
help, we will give them less; that because their needs cannot
be fully met, they will not be met at all. It does not tell
them they will get the minimum, because that is all they
can benefit from. Like other states, we undoubtedly have
some "uneducable" students, but in New Jersey there is no
such thing as an uneducable district, not under our constitution.2SS

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
[d.
[d.
Id.
[d. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403.

[d.
[d. In the summer of 1990, the New Jersey Legislature appeared willing to
cooperate in fulfilling Governor Florio's promise of more money for poorer
school districts. Sherman, supra note 182, at 1. The legislature passed the
Quality Education Act, which was part of Governor Florio's plan to balance
the state budget by cutting deeply into state programs, raising over a billion
dollars in new sales taxes, and doubling the income tax of the state's wealthiest
residents. Id. This Act would have added 1.1 billion dollars to public schools,
and would have forced local districts to pay for teachers' pensions. [d. Because
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In 1983, the Hornbeck court emphasized that Maryland, in
contrast to New Jersey, had established statewide qualitative standards through legislation, regulations and the bylaws adopted by the
State Board of Education. 256 Therefore, the Hornbeck court properly
distinguished Robinson because, at the time Robinson originally was
decided in 1973, New Jersey had not yet established even minimal
statewide qualitative standards for education. 257 Robinson dealt solely
with the financial aspects of New Jersey's public school financing
scheme because its existing law did not define "thorough and efficient" education, and the parties did not show other relevant criteria
by which to measure compliance with the constitutional mandate. 258
The Hornbeck court relied on Robinson on the basis "that absent
such standards the tax burden could not be left to local initiative
with any hope that statewide equality of educational opportunity will
emerge. "259 Additionally, the Hornbeck court noted that the New
Jersey Legislature appeared. either unwilling or unable to obey its
"constitutional mandate. "260
Though not addressed in Hornbeck, the New Jersey Legislature's
actions in response to Robinson placed New Jersey in a substantially
similar position to that of Maryland with regard to providing a
thorough and efficient system of public school education. In fact,
the Robinson court approved the 1975 public school financing scheme
specifically because it incorporated statewide qualitative standards of
education. 261 Moreover, both the Hornbeck and Robinson courts

the wealthier districts paid higher teacher salaries, requiring the local districts
to pay for teacher's pensions would have burdened the wealthier districts. Id.
The legislature amended the Quality Education Act, however, and instead
shifted the pensions back to the state and diverted a third of the new aid to
property tax relief, largely to the benefit of suburban districts. Id. Education
reformers claim that in amending the Quality Education Act, lawmakers gave
in to pressure from teachers' organizations and the wealthy suburban districts.
Id. On June 12, 1991, Marilyn Morheuser again brought suit claiming that this
public school financing scheme not only fails to solve the problem of financing
disparities, it continues to widen the gap between poorer and wealthier districts.
Id.
256. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 639,458 A.2d
758, 780 (1983).
257. [d.
258. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515-16, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (Robinson I),
a//'d on rehearing, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (Robinsnn 11), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973).
259. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 638, 458 A.2d at 780 (quoting Robinson I, 62 N.J. at
516, 303 A.2d at 295).
260. [d. at 638 n.l3, 458 A.2d at 780 n.l3.
261. The Robinson V court stated that the statute "at once seeks to define the
constitutional promise, identify the components of which it consists, establish
a procedural mechanism for its implementation and afford the financial means
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recognized that, while left to the discretion of the legislature, the
definition of a thorough and efficient system of education is evolving,
and must be judged according to contemporary qualitative standards. 262 Finally, Robinson and Hornbeck each implicitly stand for
the proposition that statewide qualitative standards of education can
be satisfied only with sufficient financial support. 263
In the wake of Abbott, coupled with the recent decisions in
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,264 Rose v. Council
for Better Education, Inc., 265 and Helena Elementary School District
No.1 v. State,266 a sound basis exists for judicial intervention in the
area of public school financing based on local wealth. 267 As the
Abbott court recognized, money that supports a thorough and efficient public school education is public money, whether it is local or
state money. Under the Maryland Constitution, the source, amount,
distribution, and use of money for public school financing is authorized and controlled by the State. 268 Under article VIII, the State

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

268.

necessary for its fulfillment." Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 456, 355 A.2d
129, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (Robinson V). The court stated that it has been
"constantly mindful that money is only one of a number of elements that
must be studied in giving definition and content to the constitutional promise
of a thorough and efficient education." Id. As in Robinson IV, the court
recognized that "individual and group disadvantages, use of compensatory
techniques for the disadvantaged and handicapped, variation in availability of
qualified teachers in different areas, effectiveness in teaching methods and
evaluation thereof, professionalism at every level of the system, meaningful
curricula, exercise of authority and discipline, and adequacy of overall goals
fixed at the policy level." Id.
See Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780; Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 45758, 355 A.2d at 133.
Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 457, 355 A.2d at 133; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458
A.2d at 780.
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
769 P .2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
See also Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 33, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90
(1983) (it is unconstitutional to base an education funding system on local
property tax); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (public
school financing which relies on property taxes causes disparities among school
districts and violates equal protection); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376
A.2d 359 (1979) (state financing of education based on local property tax,
without regard to a town's financial ability violates equal education opportunity); Seattle School Dist. No.1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)
(state has a paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of
resident children); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979)
(disparities among state's education financing violates equal protection guarantees); Washakie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo.) (state's school financing scheme based on local property taxes violates
equal protection), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 631-32, 458
A.2d 758, 776 (1983).
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is obligated to spend that money to provide adequate education for
all citizens. 269 This means that disadvantages of poorer urban districts
must be taken into consideration when financing public schools,
because "all students are entitled to be treated equally, to begin at
the same starting line. "270 If used effectively, money can give all
Maryland school children at least the chance to succeed.271
IV. RAISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
MARYLAND'S PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING SCHEME
As with the decision in Abbott, a successful constitutional challenge to Maryland's public school financing scheme must be based
on a well developed record, extensive offers of proof, and a thorough
statistical analysis which is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Fundamentally, the ability to reform the disparities and inadequacies
caused by a public school financing scheme dependent upon local
wealth rests on the willingness of the court to recognize that students
in poorer school districts are no less citizens than students in wealthier
districts. 272
In Hornbeck, the plaintiffs offered only evidence of disparity of
financing and educational inputs to show that a public school financing scheme based on local wealth violated the state constitution's
thorough and efficient clause. In Abbott, neither the plaintiffs nor
the State were able to convince the court of what was necessary for
a thorough and efficient education. 273 Nonetheless, the Abbott court
found that, whatever the standard was, the poorer urban school
districts fell below it. 274 The Abbott court recognized evidence of
269. See id. The financial burden entailed in providing a thorough and efficient
system of public schools in no way lessens the constitutional duty. Rose v.
Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989) (citations
omitted).
In fact, a California Superior Court Judge recently ruled that the state
would be failing to meet its constitutional obligation to provide students with
public education "basically equivalent" to that offered elsewhere in the state,
by allowing public schools in a bankrupt school district to shutdown six weeks
early. Judge Halts Plan to Close Schools in California District, Education
Week, May 8, 1991, at 1. Ironically, the bankrupt district was once hailed as
a national model for parental choice and other school reforms. Id. After the
judge intervened, the state stepped in with a loan to carry the district through.
the end of the school year. Id. The loan carries with it broad trustee powers
to the state to oversee district finances. Id. The judge's decision narrowly
averted the closing of 47 schools, which would have left 31,500 students without
a teacher, or even a classroom. Id.
270. See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 375, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (1990).
271. See id. at 295-96, 575 A.2d at 363.
272. See id. at 375, 575 A.2d at 403.
273. See id. at 318, 575 A.2d at 375.
274. Id.
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inadequate education that also is evident in Baltimore City when it
stated: 27S
Does the combination of student need, disproportionately
present in poorer urban districts, inferior course offerings,
dilapidated facilities, testing failures, and dropout rates leave
the issue [of whether the students in these districts are
provided a thorough and efficient education] in doubt?276
The Abbott court was unable to conclude that most districts
were failing, in part because the burden was on the plaintiffs to
show that a thorough and efficient education was not being delivered.
The court reached its decision not only out of deference to the
legislature, but also because it concluded that a constitutional violation would not be found solely on disparity of financing. 277 Yet,
given a history of disparate funding and clear evidence of inadequate
education in the poorer urban districts, the court in effect shifted
the burden to the State to show that the financing scheme was
constitutional as applied to the poorer urban districts. In so doing,
the court stated: "[W]hile we are unable to conclude from this record
that the State is clearly wrong, we would not strip all notions of
equal and adequate funding from the constitutional obligation unless
we were convinced that the State was clearly right. "278
Furthermore, the Abbott court stated that, no'matter how promising plans to make urban schools more effective appeared, the fact
that the State was trying to implement them was not enough to show
that present expenditure levels would lead to thorough and efficient
schools.279 Under Abbott, the measurement of the constitutional
requirement of thorough and efficient means "more than teaching
the skills needed to compete in the labor market. ... It means being
able to fulfill one's role as a citizen, a role that encompasses far
more than merely registering to vote. It means the ability to participate fully in society .... "280
275. See J. MuRPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK sec. IOOO(A) (1989). While

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

the court may not take judicial notice of facts simply because they are personally
known to him, the court may consider any evidence that the legislature can
consider, such as studies by educational experts showing that the inadequa!=y
of public education is related to lack of sufficient funds caused by a public
school financing scheme based on wealth. [d.; see, e.g., Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 318, 575 A.2d at 375.
See id. at 393, 575 A.2d at 412.
[d. at 377, 575 A.2d at 404.
[d. at 378, 575 A.2d at 405; see also Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 363, 575 A.2d at 397; see also Rose v. Council for Better
Educ. Inc., 709 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989).
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The Hornbeck court, while recognizing disparity with regard to
financing and educational opportunity among Maryland school districts, prudentially deferred to the General Assembly to define and
provide adequate education under the thorough and efficient clause
of the Maryland Constitution. The Abbott court also recognized that,
because educational sufficiency ultimately must be the responsibility
of the legislature, there is a limit to the court's powers in this area. 281
In order to resolve the issue of whether statewide qualitative standards
of education are met, however, Maryland courts need only turn to
the appropriate state agency: the State Board of Education. 282
Maryland school children now have the evidence which was
lacking in Hornbeck; a public school financing scheme based on
local wealth violates the thorough and efficient clause of the State
Constitution. In addition to evidence of the disparity of financing
and educational opportunity, by the State Board of Education's own
evidence Maryland's public school financing scheme does not result
in the constitutionally-mandated level of adequate education. The
MSPP Reports provide empirical evidence that, at the very least,
Baltimore City has failed to meet the State of Maryland's qualitative
standards of education in areas of basic competency required to
graduate from high school.
Thus, as in Abbott, the constitutionality of Maryland's public
school financing scheme can no longer be presumed. 283 With hard
evidence that Maryland public schools are failing to meet the State's
own definition of thorough and efficient education, the court is
entitled to ask for proof of the General Assembly's effort to achieve
the legislatively defined goal and for proof of reasonable success at
achieving that goal to effectuate compliance with the mandate of
article VIIJ.284 Moreover, as interpreter of the Constitution, the court
has a duty to speak when the General Assembly has failed Maryland
school children, and to say that the failure must be remedied. 28s
There is no constitutional right to an excellent public school
education. 286 The Hornbeck court correctly stated that, under the
Maryland Constitution, the state's obligation is limited to providing
281. See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 322, 575 A.2d at 377.
282. See J. MURPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK sec. lOOO(A)(3) (1989) "on
rare occasions. judicial notice is taken of what are conveniently characterized
as 'political' facts .... To resolve this issue, the trial judge simply contacts
the appropriate branch of government and follows that branch's decision on
the issue." Id.; see infra notes I & 8-15 and accompanying text.
283. See Biegel, supra note I (discussing the application of heightened scrutiny in
equal educational opportunity issues).
284. C/. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 322, 575 A.2d at 377.
285. C/. id.
286. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County 8d. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 632, 458 A.2d
758, 776 (1983).
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the means for the legislatively defined standard of basic or adequate
education throughout the state. 287 Under the existing financing scheme,
public education may be successful for some children, while children
attending Baltimore City schools clearly are being deprived of an
adequate education in basic skills. Wealthier parents, who desire
more for their children than the basic education mandated by the
Maryland Constitution, have the option to send their children to
private schools, or to move into neighborhoods with the better
schools. 288 Parents with lesser means have no such choice.289 While
financing a basic public education may result in a less than ideal
public education for some, that is not sufficient justification for
ignoring the constitutional mandate to provide a thorough andefficient system of public education for al1. 290
Some may argue that public school financing reform would
eliminate local control over education. This argument, however, has
no merit. As the Edgewood court stated:
An efficient system does not preclude the ability of communities to exercise local control over the education of their
children. It requires only that the funds available for education be distributed equitably and evenly. An efficient
system will actually allow for more local control, not less.
It will provide property-poor districts with economic alternatives that are not now available to them. Only if alternatives are indeed available can a community exercise the
control of making choices. 291
In fact, local autonomy in the area of public school financing is
central to preventing greater equality. 292 Eliminating school districts'
dependency on local wealth for public school financing will not alone
create adequate education, but it is a crucial step in remedying
Maryland's failure to provide an effective education in basic skills
in all districts throughout the state.
Since, as evidenced by the MSPP Reports, Baltimore City school
children are being significantly deprived of an adequate education,
and since gross inequities in the quality of educational opportunity
among Maryland school districts exist, the situation in Baltimore
City is particularly ripe for a constitutional challenge. Maryland's
existing public school financing scheme ignores the special needs of
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

[d.
See Briffault, supra note 22, at 221·22.
[d.

C/. Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 340, 575 A.2d 359, 386 (1990).
777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (N.J. 1989).
See Briffault, supra note 22, at 5 & 23·29 (discussing the history of public
school financing cases and the interest of local autonomy).
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disadvantaged students, the effects of municipal overburden, and
results in lack of sufficient preparation of students in poorer urban
districts to compete in the job market or function as responsible
citizens in our democratic society.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When faced with this issue, the Maryland courts should follow
New Jersey's enlightened treatment of public school financing based
on local wealth, and take affirmative steps to remedy this ongoing
constitutional violation. To be in compliance with article VIII, the
General Assembly must be required to amend Maryland's public
school financing scheme, or to pass new legislation to assure that
educational financing is substantially equal. Indeed, because the
Hornbeck court rejected uniform financing, it left open the possibility
that additional state financing could be allowed to address extreme
disadvantages. 293 Identifying the districts in need of additional state
financing to address extreme disadvantages and providing a mechanism for financing public schools in general are responsibilities of
the legislature. 294 Yet it is the court's constitutional duty to enforce
the General Assembly's affirmative duty under article VIII to provide
sufficient financing for an effective public school education in basic
skills in all Maryland school districts. 295

Elizabeth Colette Derrrig

293. See Abbott, 119 N.]. at 397-98, 575 A.2d at 409.
294. See id. at 385-86, 575 A.2d at 408-09.
295. See id. at 386, 575 A.2d at 409. Perhaps, in response to such a judicial
declaration, the Maryland General Assembly will surprise us, as did the
Kentucky legislature, by acting swiftly to implement a constitutional system of
public school financing. See supra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.

